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I. INTRODUCTION
IFTY years ago, a businessperson had essentially four options in
forming a business: sole-proprietorship, corporation, limited part-
nership, or general partnership.1 Since then, laws with diverse pos-
sibilities have exploded in every state. Apart from the traditional
business forms, parties to a business can now choose from a limited liabil-
ity partnership (LLP), 2 limited liability company (LLC),3 statutory close
corporation,4 or a limited liability limited partnership (LLLP).5
This expansion is mostly attributable to state legislatures trying to keep
pace with changing federal tax law.6 State lawmakers manipulated stat-
utes to offer business forms that combined limited liability and favorable
(i.e., pass-through) 7 federal income taxation.8 Indeed, the statutes gov-
1. See generally ROBERT W. HAMILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: UNINCORPO.
RATED BUSINESSES AND CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS: ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CON-
CEPTS § 1.1 (1996) (outlining "major changes" in closely held businesses since the 1950s).
2. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 16951-16962 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999); N.Y. PART-
NERSHIP LAW §§ 121-1500 to -1506 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 6132b (West 1970 & Supp. 1999).
3. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17000-17705 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999); N.Y. LTD.
LIAB. Co. LAW §§ 101 to 1403 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999); TEX. REV. Clv. STAT. ANN.
art. 1528n (West 1997 & Supp. 1999).
4. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-901 to -950 (Harrison 1990 & Supp. 1996); 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. §§ 5/2A.05-2A.60 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2301-2337 (West 1995).
5. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-64-1001 to 7-64-1010 (West 1999); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-214 (1974 & Supp. 1996). TEX. REV. CIv. STAr. ANN. art. 6132a-1,
§ 2.14 (West Supp. 1999).
6. See Symposium, Check-the-Box and Beyond: The Future of Limited Liability Enti-
ties, 52 Bus. LAW. 605, 608-10 (1997) [hereinafter Check-the-Box and Beyond]; Dale A.
Oesterle & Wayne M. Gazur, What's in a Name?: An Argument for a Small Business "Lim-
ited Liability Entity" Statute (With Three Subsets of Default Rules), 32 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 101, 102-03 (1997) [hereinafter Oesterle & Gazur] ("Drafters of the new small busi-
ness forms aimed to decouple limited liability from a corporate level tax.").
7. See infra text accompanying notes 31-36.
8. The development of the LLC is a classic example of federal taxation's role in the
formation of business statutes. In the sixteen months following Revenue Ruling 88-76,
which classified the LLC as a partnership for federal taxation purposes, LLC filings in
Wyoming increased seventy-three percent (totaling thirty-two new filings). See Susan Pace
Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing the Corporate Integration
Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393, 440-41 (1996) [hereinafter Hamill, The Limited Liability
Company]. Within four years of the Service's ruling, 8,500 new LLCs were created. See id.
In 1993, the thirty-two states that had adopted LLC statutes had a total of 23,000 filings for
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erning business organizations today would probably have been structured
much differently had past tax pressures been less intrusive.9 The morass
that developed, whatever the reason, 10 is complicated,"1 irrational,' 2 and
inconsistent.13
Now these tax pressures have, in large part,' 4 been relieved.' 5 In May
1996, the Department*of Treasury (the "Treasury") implemented new
regulations, known as the "check-the-box" regulations, 16 which relieve
the federal tax pressure on state legislatures.' 7 The check-the-box regula-
tions present a unique opportunity for states to examine why statutes
have developed as they have and to consider re-working the entire statu-
tory scheme.18
the year. See id. at 442. For more information on the development of the LLC, see infra
text accompanying notes 187-219.
9. See generally Oesterle & Gazur, supra note 6, at 104 (suggesting that states must
"start from scratch .... [to] construct a business organization statute that is internally
coherent, flexible, understandable, and consistent with organizers' intuitive sense of how
the structure should work.").
10. One commentator argues that other reasons statutes may have developed the way
they did is because of over reliance on "imperfect legislator incentives" or interest group
pressures. See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability Companies: Statutory Forms for Closely
Held Firms: Theories and Evidence from LLCs, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 369, 402-03 (1995)
[hereinafter Ribstein, Theories and Evidence from LLCs].
11. See Oesterle & Gazur, supra note 6, at 104 (explaining that "[some] find the still-
developing maze of alternate forms of business organization difficult to navigate and un-
duly costly").
12. One commentator has cited three reasons why the "maze" of business organiza-
tion is irrational: (1) many statutes contain obsolete provisions that were based on Treasury
Regulations; (2) the various titles of the different forms create havoc with regulatory stat-
utes; and (3) as states amend the statutes they are "driving all forms toward each other."
Id.
13. See generally Robert R. Keatinge et al., Limited Liability Partnerships: The Next
Step in the Evolution of the Unincorporated Business Organization, 51 Bus. LAW. 147, 207
(1995) [hereinafter Keatinge et al., Limited Liability Partnerships] (emphasizing that "[o]ne
unavoidable consequence of this evolution is the laws develop inconsistently, with differing
procedural and substantive provisions. It seems certain this trend will continue.").
14. There remains one "nagging" federal tax issue. Chapter 14 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code may limit the ability of estate planners to use the LLC as a wealth transfer
device. See KATHRYN G. HENKEL, ESTATE PLANNING AND WEALTH PRESERVATION:
STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS §§ 15-16 (Supp. 1998); Oesterle & Gazur, supra note 6, at
132-41.
15. See Laurel Wheeling Farrar & Susan Pace Hamill, Dissociation from Alabama
Limited Liability Companies in the Post Check-the-Box Era, 49 Ala. L. Rev. 909, 934-35
(1998) [hereinafter Farrar & Hamill] (commenting on the irony that valuation rules under
section 2204 of the Internal Revenue Code keep some taxation issues in the forefront).
16. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 (1996), 301.7701-2 (1996), 301.7701-3 (1998).
17. See generally Oesterle & Gazur, supra note 6, at 114; Check-the-Box and Beyond,
supra note 6, at 608-10 (claiming the new regulations "mark the toppling of the old, formal-
istic regime").
18. Check-the-box may prompt several changes, including:
[11 business association statutes such as those for LLCs and limited partner-
ships, which have included partnership features for tax purposes, including
multiple owner requirements, restrictions on transferability and continuity,
and decentralized management, will now be amended to eliminate these
features;[2] the C corporation no longer will be used by closely held firms; and
3] differences among business associations will become less important as
statues are no longer used for tax-classification purposes.
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This Comment proposes that states maximize this opportunity by sim-
plifying business entity statutes into a three-statute model-the general
partnership, the LLC, and the corporation. This model first contemplates
the general partnership, which would serve as a catch-all entity for parties
that have chosen not to file with the state. Second, the LLC must be
highly flexible to accommodate the limited partnership, close corpora-
tion, LLP, and other business entities. In order to do this, the LLC
should entail a comprehensive set of default rules, yet should remain flex-
ible by remaining largely contractarian in nature. 19 Third, the corpora-
tion should have a series of traditional, mandatory rules to serve large,
publicly held corporations and their shareholders. States should focus
their attention and resources on these three business forms and should
allow the limited partnership, LLP, close corporation, and other miscella-
neous business forms to fall by the wayside.
There is considerable support among commentators for some form of
simplification of business organization statutes.20 But other commenta-
tors have argued against simplification. For example, Professor Larry E.
Ribstein suggests that "separate statutes suit the needs of different types
of firms. Partly for regulation (and past tax) reasons, different statutes
have attracted their own 'clienteles' of firms. ' 21 Surely "different statutes
have attracted different clienteles of firms," but that has largely been be-
cause of tax reasons that, as Professor Ribstein indicates, are now in the
past.22
Because these tax reasons no longer exist, if states can simplify their
statutes, they should. Simplification helps the business organizer who
may lack the acumen necessary to recognize that choice of entity could
have severe repercussions in tax, securities, or other areas. The general
public also benefits from a simplified statutory scheme by being able to
more quickly recognize an entity and by knowing what type of liability
protection accompanies that particular entity. Additionally, it is more
likely that investors know their rights, thereby giving them the ability to
Check-the-Box and Beyond, supra note 6, at 610; Oesterle & Gazur, supra note 6, at 104.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 242-334.
20. Professors Larry E. Ribstein and Mark A. Sargent edited an on-line discussion
between lawyers and law professors regarding the impact of the check-the-box regulations'
on unincorporated business entities. Several participants argued for simplification of busi-
ness statutes. See Check-the-Box and Beyond, supra note 6, at 612-15, 617-18; see also
Mark J. Loewenstein, A New Direction for State Corporate Codes, 68 U. COLO. L. REV.
453, 470-73 (1997) [hereinafter Lowenstein] ("In light of the check-the-box regulations...
state legislatures should reexamine the statutes authorizing the formation of the
noncorporate entities with a view to consolidating these statutes."); Oesterle & Gazur,
supra note 6, at 141-48 (proposing the "limited liability entity," which would contain a set
of core provisions along with three alternative default rules: one where all investors are
active in firm management, one that has unsophisticated passive investors, and one that
has sophisticated passive investors).




make more informed business decisions.23 For example, an investor in a
corporation will be able to quickly determine that corporate stock is
transferable. But the same investor in an LLC will know to look to the
LLC agreement to determine whether LLC interests are transferable.
In short, our existing system benefits practitioners and academics who
thrive on sorting out the choice of entity issue. Given the past tax pres-
sures that shaped the business forms we know today, it is understandable
that confusion exists. But to continue as though this is what states would
have wanted all along is disingenuous. Check-the-box has come, the tax
pressures are off, and it is time to simplify.
II. BACKGROUND
A. TAXATION BACKGROUND
Much of the choice-of-entity decision is based on how the entity will be
taxed. Hence, before an effective analysis of business forms can begin,
the influence of federal taxation must be discussed.
1. Corporation vs. Partnership
The primary distinction between corporate and partnership taxation is
whether the entity will be double taxed. Corporations are subject to the
"double tax regime" of subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code (the
"Code").24 Double taxation occurs when a C corporation realizes taxable
income or gain25 and then distributes cash or property to its shareholders.
Income or gain at the shareholder level must be recognized in distribu-
tions, 26 redemption,27 and liquidation. 8 Thus, if a C corporation realizes
a $100 gain on the sale of property and subsequently pays out $100 in
dividends, $50 to each of its two shareholders, then the corporation will
be taxed on the $100 gain,29 and each shareholder must include his $50
23. See Loewenstein, supra note 20, at 473 ("[With a simplified approach,] the choice
of entity would be more clear to the client, who could then make a more informed decision
than is likely under current law.").
24. See I.R.C. §§ 301-85 (1999).
25. See I.R.C. §§ 11, 311, 336 (1998).
26. Dividends, which are distributions of the corporation's earnings and profits, are
always included in gross income. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(7), 301(c)(1), 316 (1998). Distribu-
tions in excess of the corporation's earnings and profits are applied against the share-
holder's stock basis. See I.R.C. § 301(c)(2) (1998). Amounts that exceed the shareholder's
stock basis must be recognized as capital gain. See I.R.C. § 301(c)(3) (1998).
27. A stock redemption is treated as an exchange if the conditions in subsections (1),
(2), (3), or (4) of section 302(b) are met. See I.R.C. § 302(b) (1998). Otherwise, redemp-
tions are treated as distributions. See I.R.C. § 301(c) (1998).
28. "Amounts received by a shareholder in a distribution in complete liquidation...
[are] treated as. . . full payment in exchange for the stock." See I.R.C. § 331(a) (1998). If
gain or loss is recognized, shareholder basis is fair market value at the time of distribution.
See I.R.C. § 334(a) (1998). For a discussion on Subchapter C's double tax regime, see 1
EDWIN T. HOOD & JOHN J. MYLAN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.01
(1998); see also I ZOLMAN CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNING
§ 2.04(1) (1999) (describing double taxation as the "weightiest criticism of the corporate
form").
29. See I.R.C. §§ 311, 336 (1998).
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dividend in gross income.30
Partnerships, by contrast, are taxed under subchapter K of the Code,
which does not double tax.31 Partnerships are taxed using pass-through
taxation.32 Accordingly, a partnership pays no federal income tax; it must
only file an informational return that reports the partnership's income,
gain, loss, and deduction.33 These items are passed through to the indi-
vidual partners,34 and each partner is then taxed on the partnership's gain
or loss based on his interest in the partnership. 35 Thus, in the preceding
example, if a partnership realizes a $100 gain and allocates $50 to each
partner, then $100 flows through the partnership and each partner must
include $50 in gross income.36
Aside from a single level of taxation, subchapter K has other advan-
tages over subchapter C. First, partnerships have enormous flexibility in
allocating profits and losses. As long as an allocation reflects the true
financial reality between the partners (i.e., substantial economic effect),
partners can structure their financial agreement however they wish.37 For
example, an equal partnership can allocate ninety percent of partnership
income to one partner and ten percent of partnership income to the
other. Similarly, the same partnership can allocate all foreign income to
one partner and all domestic income to the other. Both of these alloca-
tion schemes are valid if they have substantial economic effect.38
Second, partnership liabilities increase a partners' basis in their part-
nership interest.39 This is valuable because an increased basis decreases
the amount of gain partners must recognize from partnership distribu-
30. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (1998).
31. See I.R.C. §§ 701-61 (1999). See generally IWILLIAM S. McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL
TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS §§ 9.01-9.06 (2d ed. 1990).
32. Also called conduit or flow-through taxation.
33. See I.R.C. § 6031 (1998).
34. See I.R.C. § 702 (1998).
35. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(13), 701-02 (1999). The tax consequences to each partner are
determined by the partnership agreement. See I.R.C. § 704(a) (1999) ("A partner's distrib-
utive share of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit shall ... be determined by the part-
nership agreement.").
36. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(13), 702, 704(a) (1999).
37. To ensure that the partnership's allocations truly reflect the financial relationship
between the partners, the Treasury Regulations require that two tests be met for each
allocation: the economic effect test and the substantiality test. An allocation has economic
effect if (1) the partnership properly maintains capital accounts, (2) the partnership liqui-
dates in accordance with positive capital accounts, and (3) each partner is unconditionally
obligated to restore any deficit in his capital account. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(a),
(b) (1997). The economic effect test verifies that the allocation is consistent with the part-
ners' underlying economic arrangement.
The substantiality test is met "if there is a reasonable possibility that the allocation (or
allocations) will affect substantially the dollar amounts to be received by the partners from
the partnership .... " Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a) (1997). In other words, if the
partnership agreement allocates all foreign income to partner A and all domestic income
to partner B, then there must be a reasonable possibility that either domestic or foreign
income could change such that one partner could be worse off and the other better off.
38. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1997).
39. See I.R.C. § 752(a) (1998); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.752-1, -2, -3 (1991); see also I.R.C.
§§ 752(b), 722, 733(1), 705(a)(2) (1998).
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tions.40 Also, partners may recognize partnership losses to the extent of
their basis in the partnership.41
There is one other form of corporate taxation. Corporations that qual-
ify as a "small business corporation" can escape the double tax by elect-
ing to be a subchapter S corporation.42 Subchapter S of the Code allows
an incorporated organization to receive pass-through taxation, but there
are several undesirable qualities about subchapter S.43 First, in order to
make the subchapter S election, a corporation must satisfy several limit-
ing criteria.44 Second, subchapter S is less flexible than subchapter K.
Allocations must be made in accordance with each shareholder's pro rata
share of the corporation,45 and the corporation's liabilities do not in-
crease shareholders' stock basis.46 Third, subchapter S directs all issues
not addressed by subchapter S to subchapter C's double-taxing clutches-
such as subchapter C's corporate liquidation provisions.47 In sum, sub-
chapter S is no longer the "preferred choice" for the majority of private
businesses. 48
2. Classification
Now that corporate and partnership taxation have been summarized, it
is easy to understand why many parties to a business desire to be classi-
fied as a partnership for tax purposes. But historically classification as
corporation or partnership has been left to the arbitrary and confusing
classification provisions in the Code and Treasury Regulations.
Section 7701 of the Code classifies business organizations as either a
40. See I.R.C. § 731(a) (1) (1999).
41. See I.R.C. § 704(d) (1999).
42. See I.R.C. § 1361(a)(1) (1999).
43. See I.R.C. §§ 1361-79 (1999).
44. Specifically, the corporation must not: (1) have more than 75 shareholders; (2)
have a shareholder who is not an individual; (3) have a nonresident alien as a shareholder;
and (4) have more than one class of stock. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1) (1999). Recent trends
indicate a congressional attempt to make subchapter S more desirable to closely held cor-
porations by relaxing these criteria. See I.R.C. §§ 1361(c)(1), 1361(c)(2), 1361(c)(5),
1362(0 (1999); see also 2 EDWIN T. HOOD & JOHN J. MYLAN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
CLOSE CORPORATIONS, § 24:01 (1997) [hereinafter 2 HOOD & MYLAN]; Walter D.
Schwidetzky, Is it Time to Give the S Corporation a Proper Burial, 15 VA. TAX REV. 591,
594-96 (1996).
45. See I.R.C. § 1366(a) (1999). "Each shareholder's pro rata share of [income, gain,
loss, and deductions] for any taxable year of the S corporation is determined on a per
share, per day basis." 2 HOOD & MYLAN, supra note 44, § 24:14. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1377-1
to -3 (1996). Although there are planning techniques to vary this treatment (e.g., employee
compensation or rent payments to shareholders), subchapter S does not offer nearly the
same degree of flexibility as subchapter K. See Schwidetzky, supra note 44, at 596.
46. See I.R.C. §§ 752(a), 752(b), 722,733(1), 750(a)(2) (1998); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.752-1, -
2, -3 (1998); see also Schwidetzky, supra note 44, at 597-98.
47. See I.R.C. § 1371(a) (1999). Thus, an "S Corporation" would look to the corporate
liquidation rules of Subchapter C, which would cause the corporation, and thus the share-
holders, to recognize any gain on the liquidation. See I.R.C. §§ 331, 336 (1999); see also
infra text accompanying notes 348-53.
48. See Schwidetzky, supra note 44, at 592.
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(1) corporation 49 or (2) partnership.50 The term partnership includes any
unincorporated organization that is not a corporation within the meaning
of section 7701.5 1 The term corporation, however, includes "associa-
tions," which can include unincorporated organizations. 52 The Code
leaves further definition of corporation and partnership to the Treasury.
5 3
a. The Kintner Regulations
The crux of the classification debate has been which unincorporated
organizations are "associations" under the Code and which are partner-
ships. The Kintner regulations,5 4 named after the Ninth Circuit decision
United States v. Kintner,55 classified an unincorporated organization as an
association for tax purposes "if it [had] more corporate than noncorpo-
rate characteristics. '56 There were four criteria for determining whether
an unincorporated organization more closely resembled a partnership or
a corporation: (1) continuity of life,5 7 (2) free transferability of interests5 8
49. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1999).
50. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (1999).
51. See id.
52. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1999).
53. See I.R.C. § 7701(1) (1999).
54. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 (as amended in 1977), 301.7701-2 (as amended in
1993), 301.7701-3 (as amended in 1995).
55. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). See also Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in
1993).
56. Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerg-
ing Entity, 47 Bus. LAw. 378, 424 (1992) [hereinafter Keatinge et al. A Study of the Emerg-
ing Entity]. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1993).
57. "An organization [had] continuity of life if the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retire-
ment, resignation, or expulsion of any member [did] not cause a dissolution of the organi-
zation." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1993). These triggering events
alter the identity of the entity by changing the relationship between the members or part-
ners. Hence, continuity of life did not exist in a limited partnership if the withdrawal of a
general partner caused dissolution. See id This is true "notwithstanding the fact that a
dissolution... may be avoided .... by the remaining general partners agreeing to continue
the partnership." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (as amended in 1993). Corporations, by con-
trast, have continuity of life because they have "a continuing identity which is detached
from the relationship between its stockholders." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2) (as
amended in 1993).
58. An organization had free transferability of interests "if each of its members or
those members owning substantially all of the interests in the organization [had] the power,
without the consent of other members, to substitute for themselves in the same organiza-
tion a person who is not a member of the organization." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (as
amended in 1993). The member must have been able "to confer upon his substitute all the
attributes of his interest in the organization." Id. Thus, free transferability of interest did




(3) centralization of management,59 and (4) limited liability.60 An organi-
zation having more than two of these characteristics was classified as an
"association" for federal tax purposes. 6'
The Kintner regulations prompted legislatures to adopt new statutes
that would allow for the benefits of incorporating and the tax advantage
of being classified as a partnership. 62 Also, transactional attorneys began
drafting agreements that purposely failed two of the four characteristics
in the Kintner regulations in order to be classified as a partnership. 63
b. The Check-the-Box Regulations
The check-the-box regulations replaced the Kintner regulations with a
simplified format, which allows parties in an unincorporated business to
choose the entity's tax classification: partnership or association.64 In so
doing, the Treasury withdrew the complicated four-part test and replaced
it with a simple form that must be filed with the Internal Revenue Service
(the "Service"). 65
Treasury first alerted taxpayers that it was considering check-the-box
regulations in Notice 95-1466 and initially proposed them in May 1996.67
On January 1, 1997, the check-the-box regulations were implemented. 68
59. "An organization [had] centralized management if any person (or any group of
persons which [did] not include all the members) [had] continuing exclusive authority to
make the management decisions necessary to the conduct of the business for which the
organization was formed." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1) (as amended in 1993). The regu-
lations indicated that larger organizations were more likely to have centralized manage-
ment than smaller organizations. See id. The managers need not have been members of
the organization. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2) (as amended in 1993). Furthermore,
the regulations stressed that authority must be exclusive and ratification by the members of
the organization was not necessary. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c), (3) (as amended in
1993).
60. An organization had limited liability if "there [was] no member who [was] person-
ally liable for the debts of or claims against the organization." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
2(d)(1) (as amended in 1993). Limited liability comes in a variety of flavors. For instance,
the Texas LLP provides a limited set of liability protections, but the Texas LLC provides
more of a corporation-like limited liability. See Paul R. Erickson & Buddy J. Sanders,
Assessing LLCs v. LLPs, 28 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1005, 1014-17 (1997) [hereinafter Erick-
son & Sanders] (comparing the Texas LLC and LLP).
61. Additionally, most states used-and some still use-the Kintner Regulations for
state tax classification purposes. See infra text accompanying notes 370-75.
62. See Keatinge et al., A Study of the Emerging Entity, supra note 56, at 432-30.
63. See Tassma A. Powers & Deby L. Forry, Comment, Partnership Taxation & The
Limited Liability Company: Check Out the Check-the-Box Entity Classification, 32 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 831, 847-48 (1997) [hereinafter Powers & Forry] ("Prior to the check-the-
box regulations, articles of organizations and operating agreements were strategically
drafted to avoid being classified as associations. An inordinate amount of time, energy,
and resources were used in attempting to draft articles of organization which lacked two of
the four corporate resemblance factors."); see also 3 ROBERT L. WHrrMiRE ar AL., FED.
ERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS: STRUCTURING AND DRAFTING
AGREEMENTS §§ 2.01 - 2.04 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter WHITMIRE].
64. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (1998).
65. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c) (1998).
66. Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297.
67. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.6109-1, 301.7701-1 to -4, -6 to -7 (1999).
68. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 (1996), 301.7701-2 (1996), 301.7701-3 (as amended in
1997).
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In the preamble to its announcement of check-the-box, Treasury cited
"historic differences under local law between partnerships and corpora-
tions" as the reason that the Kintner regulations were a necessary part of
federal tax law.69 But the "traditional distinctions" between corporations
and partnerships under state law have narrowed "considerably. '70 The
advent of unincorporated organizations and partnerships that possess the
characteristics traditionally associated with corporations caused the
Treasury to replace the "increasingly formalistic rules" with a simplified
election.71
The following describes the mechanics of the check-the-box regula-
tions. Under section 301.7701-2, business entities can either be classified
as corporations or partnerships for federal taxation purposes. 72 A busi-
ness entity is considered a corporation if: (1) the entity is organized under
a state incorporation statute;73 (2) the entity is an association under sec-
tion 301.7701-3; 74 or (3) the entity falls in a variety of other miscellaneous
classifications.75 The check-the-box regulations do not permit these busi-
ness organizations to choose their own classifications. Thus, such organi-
zations must be classified as a corporation.
Any entity other than those listed in section 301.7701-2 is eligible to
choose its classification under section 301.7701-3.76 An "eligible entity"
may elect to be classified as a partnership or as an "association" (i.e., a
corporation under section 301.7701-2(b)(2)). 77 A newly-formed domestic
eligible entity that does not file an election will automatically be classified
as a partnership if it has two or more members. 78 Existing eligible enti-
ties will, however, not be automatically reclassified under the default
69. Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989 (1996).
70. Id. at 21,989-90.
71. Id. at 21,990.
72. "Whether an organization is an entity separate from its owners for federal tax
purposes is a matter of federal tax law and does not depend on whether the organization is
recognized as an entity under local law." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a) (as amended in
1996). To be classified as a partnership, the business entity must have at least two or more
members. If there is only one member then the entity is classified as a corporation or it is
disregarded. If the single member chooses to be disregarded, "its activities are treated in
the same manner as a sole proprietorship, branch, or division of the owner." Treas. Reg.
§§ 301.7701-2(a), 7701-2(c)(2) (as amended in 1996).
73. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1996).
74. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2) (as amended in 1996).
75. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(b)(3) to 7701-2(b)(7) (as amended in 1996). The list
includes joint stock companies, insurance companies, certain banking organizations, state-
owned companies, and any other entity that is taxable as a corporation under any other
section in the Code. Section 301.7701-2(b)(8) lists certain foreign entities, by country, that
will be classified as a corporation. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(8) (as amended in
1996).
76. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (1998).
77. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (1998). A business entity with "a single owner can
elect to be classified as an association or to be disregarded as an entity separate from its
owner." Id.
78. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1) (1998). The default rule for entities with one
member is to disregard the entity and treat it like a sole proprietorship.
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rules. 7 9 They may, however, elect to change their status.80
The check-the-box regulations make the resemblance test under the
Kintner regulations obsolete.81 States can now reexamine their intentions
for creating their existing statutory schemes. Likewise, LLCs can now
freely structure their agreements to the limits of state law without the
threat of double taxation.82
B. AN ANALYSIS OF THE HODGEPODGE OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
Before a comprehensive recommendation on the future of business en-
terprises can be made, each entity must be analyzed individually. This
Section evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the most popular busi-
ness entities: the traditional corporation, general partnership, limited
partnership, close corporation, LLP, and LLC.
I. Corporations
Traditional corporations were structured to suit large and publicly held
enterprises.8 3 There are four fundamental characteristics of a corpora-
tion. First, a corporation is centrally managed through a board of direc-
tors for the benefit of passive shareholders.84 Material decisions in the
operations of a corporation are made by the board of directors and the
officers of the corporation 8 5
79. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(3) (1998).
80. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c) (1998) (describing the election procedures under
the check-the-box regulations).
Generally, an eligible entity would file a form with the appropriate service
center, and a copy of the election form would be included with the entity's
tax return for the year the election is effective. Unanimous consent of an
entity's membership would not be required: an election could be signed by
either all the members or an authorized officer, manager, or owner.
Internal Revenue Service, Advance Copies of Regulations: Proposed "Check-the-Box"
Regs Issued, 71 TAX NoTEs 881, 881 (1996). Also, once an election is made, it cannot be
changed for sixty months. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(iv) (1998).
81. See Check-the-Box and Beyond, supra note 6, at 610 ([William Callison] suggesting
the Kintner regulations have "become irrelevant and the undergrowth of interpretive law
has been cleared out in favor of bright line rules.").
82. While the threat of double taxation has been removed at the federal level, there
remain additional considerations before an LLC takes full advantage of centralized man-
agement, continuity of life, and transferability of interest. For example, state taxation may
still influence choice-of-entity decisions if states do not conform with the federal check-the-
box style of classification. See infra text accompanying notes 370-75. Also, state and fed-
eral courts may be more prone to call an interest in an LLC a security if the LLC has
centralized management with passive investors similar to the limited partnership or corpo-
ration. See infra note 216.
83. See 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 7:02 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter 2 O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF
MINORrrY SHAREHOLDERS] ("Traditional statutory and judicial norms of corporate law are
oriented toward large, publicly held corporations and presume a separation of function
between shareholders, who provide the capital, and directors and officers who supply
management.").
84. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1991 & Supp. 1998).
85. For example, employment and salary decisions and timing and amounts of divi-
dends are decisions controlled by the board of directors. These corporate powers are typi-
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Second, corporate stock is freely transferable.86 Free transferability
tends to make stock more marketable. Historically, restrictions on trans-
fer were unenforceable 87 or narrowly interpreted 88 by courts. In any
event, absolute restrictions (i.e., restrictions requiring shareholders' unan-
imous approval) on transfer are not permissible.
Third, corporations have continuity of life, unless it is otherwise agreed
that the corporation will only exist for a specified term. A corporation
can dissolve with shareholders' approval. 89
Fourth, and the corporation's centerpiece, is the limited liability it of-
fers to shareholders.90 Historically, limited liability attracted closely held
businesses to the corporate form-despite the drawbacks of double taxa-
tion and free transferability of stock.91
These characteristics-limited liability, free transferability of interest,
centralized management, and continuity of life-are, to many organiza-
tions, tremendous benefits of incorporation, but they can also be undesir-
able.92 For instance, free transferability of stock may cause a shareholder
to lose his share of control or may force the shareholder to do business
with someone he dislikes or distrusts. 93 Limited liability may also hinder
the corporation's ability to obtain financing in that it "seems to limit the
credit line available to the corporation to that justified by its own assets
without resort to those of the stockholders." 94 Additionally, double taxa-
tion may make the corporate form undesirable, 95 and check-the-box reg-
ulations do not alleviate this concern since state law corporations are
always subject to corporate classification. 96
2. General Partnerships
A general partnership is an "association of two or more persons to
carry on as co-owners a business for profit." 97 Partnerships vary in signif-
icant ways from corporations. States regulate corporations by requiring
cally of much interest to the shareholder of a close corporation. See 2 O'NEAL'S
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 83, § 7:02.
86. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 201 (1991).
87. See, e.g., Rafe v. Hindin, 288 N.Y.S.2d 662, 665 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968), affdmem.,
244 N.E.2d 469 (N.Y. 1968).
88. See, e.g., Frandsen v. Jensen-Sundquist Agency, Inc., 802 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir.
1986).
89. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275 (1991).
90. See CHESTER ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS EN.
TERPRISES § 2A.01[1](1) (John P. Obrien et al. eds., 5th ed. 1975).
91. See id. §§ 2A.01[1](1), .01[3], .03.
92. See id. § 2A.01[2].
93. See idL § 2A.04.
94. Id § 2A.01[2](1).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 24-48.
96. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1996); see also supra text ac-
companying notes 72-80.
97. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 6(l) (1914 Act), 6 U.L.A. 256 (1995) [hereinafter




an initial filing98 and compliance with corporate formalities (such as
maintaining a board of directors and conducting annual meetings). 99 In
partnership law, two or more persons who "carry on" a business together
create a partnership; no state filing is required. Further, there are no
required formalities for a partnership. 1°°
In a partnership, liability is not limited;101 management is decentralized
with each partner receiving one vote;10 2 and interest in the partnership is
not freely transferable. 0 3 Moreover, a partnership dissolves if one of the
partners disassociates with the firm, dies, or declares bankruptcy.1°4 The
Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) added that a partnership will
dissolve if a partner "has otherwise become incapable of performing.' 10 5
Management rules and transferability restrictions, of course, can each be
altered by agreement.' °6
To many closely held firms, general partnership characteristics like re-
strictions on transferability of interest, lack of continuity of life, and
member management are desirable. Pass-through taxation is another de-
sirable attribute of the partnership. 10 7 But many closely held firms are
unwilling to accept full liability for fellow partner's actions.
3. Limited Partnerships
Limited partnerships have two main characteristics in common with the
general partnership form. First, with a few restrictions,108 limited part-
98. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101 - 110 (1991 & Supp. 1996).
99. See, e.g., i §§ 141, 211-31. Failure to follow these formalities can result in pierc-
ing the corporate veil. See ROHRLICH, supra note 90, § 2A.06[1].
100. See 1 ALLAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIP § 2.01(a) (1997) [hereinafter BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP].
While there are no requisite formalities in the formation or operation of a partnership, the
partners may want to consider writing a partnership agreement, registering the business
name, and procuring necessary licenses or registrations. See id
101. See UPA, supra note 97, §§ 9(1), 15.
102. See id. § 18(e).
103. The only transferable interest in a partnership is the financial share. See id. §§ 26,
27. Transfer of an interest does not entitle the receiver of the interest to participate in
management of the partnership. See id.
104. See UPA, supra note 97, § 31
105. RUPA, supra note 97, § 601.
106. See UPA, supra note 97, § 18.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 31-36.
108. The main restriction on limited partnerships as compared to general partnerships
concerns allocations. For an allocation to comply with section 704, it must have substantial
economic effect. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (as amended in 1997); see also supra note
37. One requirement of the economic effect test is that partners must be unconditionally
obligated to restore a deficit in their capital accounts. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)
(as amended in 1997). This restoration obligation exists because limited partners are not
obligated to restore a deficit in their capital accounts. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNER-
SHIP Acr § 303(a) (1976), 6A U.L.A. 1 (1995) [hereinafter RULPA]. The allocation must
meet the alternate test for economic effect. The alternate test requires that the limited
partnership (1) properly maintain partners' capital accounts, (2) liquidate in accordance
with positive capital accounts, and (3) not make an allocation that would push any limited
partner's capital account into a deficit. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d) (as amended
in 1997); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(c)(1), 1.704-l(b)(5) example (1) (as amended in
1997). The alternate test also requires that the partnership agreement include a "qualified
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nerships receive pass-through taxation as well as the other benefits of
taxation under subchapter K.109 Second, general partners have no pro-
tection from the limited partnership's liabilities. 110
But limited partnerships differ from general partnerships in several
ways. First, and most notably, limited partners are shielded from liability
for obligations of the limited partnership.'11 Second, unlike partners in a
general partnership, a limited partner may exercise only limited control
over the limited partnership. 1" 2 Exerting too much control can expose a
limited partner to personal liability as if he were a general partner. 13
Third, because of their limited liability protection, limited partnerships
must file with the state 1 4 and must adhere to certain formalities." 5
However, the limited partnership form allows capital and service prov-
iders to structure unique agreements whereby a passive investor (i.e., the
limited partner) can have rights to profits of the business without being
liable for the losses. 1 6 A limited partnership agreement will often re-
quire an initial capital contribution from the limited partners with mini-
mal contribution from the general partner1 7 Limited partners will also
frequently receive a large percentage of the distributions at first, although
perhaps tapering off at the end when financial objectives are attained."18
"On the winding up of the partnership, the assets are distributed to the
partners according to their capital accounts."" 19
The growth of limited partnerships has been due especially to "their
use as hoped-for tax shelters. Limited partnerships have been particu-
larly popular where the tax advantages of depletion and depreciation, in-
come deferral, and ultimate capital gain treatment-combined with
limited liability-have been most attractive .... ,120 But many of the
advantages to the tax shelter have been taken away one-by-one by Con-
gress and Treasury.' 2'
income offset" provision, which requires the partnership to allocate the first amount of
income to a limited partnership if an unexpected cash distribution pushes the limited part-
ner's capital account below zero. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704(b)(2)(ii)(d) (as amended in 1997).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 31-41.
110. See RULPA, supra note 108, § 403.
111. See id. § 303(a).
112. Limited partners may exert some control over the limited partnership. For exam-
ple, RULPA provides a safe harbor that allows a limited partner to consult with and advise
the general partner on the business of the limited partnership. See id. § 303(b)(2).
113. See id. § 303(a). However, the limited partner is only liable to third parties who
reasonably believe, based on the limited partner's conduct, that he is a general partner.
See id.
114. See id. §§ 201-08.
115. See, e.g., id. §§ 105, 209. See generally BROMBERG & RIBS'rEIN ON PARTNERSHIP,
supra note 100, § 11.01(b).
116. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP, supra note 100, § 11.02.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. Id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d) (as amended in 1997).
120. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP, supra note 100, § 11.01(f).
121. There are now four hurdles that must be overcome for a limited partnership to
recognize a loss. First, allocations in a limited partnership must meet the alternate test for
economic effect. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d) (as amended in 1997). In order to
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Limited partnerships have also been the traditional favorite of tax
planners for family tax planning.12 2 There are generally two uses for fam-
ily limited partnerships. First, family limited partnerships have commonly
been used to minimize income taxes in families that want to pass the fam-
ily business from generation to generation. 123 Parents, presumably in
high tax brackets, make annual gifts of partnership interests to the chil-
dren in lower tax brackets. 124 Parents should make gifts up to the maxi-
mum gift tax exclusion, which is $10,000 per donee per year or $20,000
per year for spouses. 125 "As gifts are made, the income which would
have been reported on the parent's income tax return, at a high marginal
income tax rate, is now reported on the children's income tax return, at a
lower marginal income tax rate."' 26 Thus, the net taxes paid by the fam-
ily are lower.
Second, tax planners use the family limited partnership as an estate
planning tool. 127 Here, a parent contributes assets or the family business
to a limited partnership.' 28 Gifting programs similar to the one men-
tioned above are used to lower income taxes in life. A gift of a limited
partnership interest allows the parent to maximize tax savings without
relinquishing control over assets (since the gifts are limited partnership
units). 29 When the parent dies, the estate owns partnership units instead
of the assets that were contributed. Moreover, restricted transferability
meet this test, generally the partnership cannot make an allocation that would push a lim-
ited partner's capital account into a deficit. See id. Second, limited partners may recognize
a loss only to the extent of their outside basis. See I.R.C. §§ 704(d), 705(a)(2) (1999).
Third, limited partners can deduct a loss only to the extent that the partner is at risk with
the activity at the end of the partnership year. See I.R.C. § 465 (1999). Fourth, passive
losses can only be offset by passive income. See I.R.C. § 469 (1999).
122. See generally HENKEL, supra note 14, §§ 15-16; MARK A. SARGENT & WALTER D.
SCHWIDETZKY, LIMITED LIABILrY COMPANY HANDBOOK ch. 4 (1998); Travis L. Bowen &
Rick D. Bailey, Limited Partnerships: Use in Tax, Estate and Business Planning, 32 IDAHO
L. REV. 305 (1996) [hereinafter Bowen & Bailey].
123. The benefits of family limited partnerships are not limited to taxation. There are
also significant business benefits, including (1) pooling assets and investments earn the
family economies of scale, (2) placing assets in such an entity protects the assets from
creditors, and (3) gifting limited partnership units to younger family members facilitates
passing the business from generation-to-generation. See generally HENKEL, supra note 14,
§§ 15-16; Bowen & Bailey, supra note 122, at 326-27.
124. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1999); see also HENKEL, supra note 14, § 16.03; Bowen &
Bailey, supra note 122, at 326-29.
125. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1999); see also Bowen & Bailey, supra note 122, at 328-29.
126. Bowen & Bailey, supra note 122, at 326.
127. See HENKEL, supra note 14, §§ 15-16; Bowen & Bailey, supra note 122.
128. See HENKEL, supra note 14, §§ 15-16; Bowen & Bailey, supra note 122, at 330-33.
129. See Bowen & Bailey, supra note 122, at 331. The parent can retain control over
the assets by naming themselves the general partner. But naming only one general partner
can be troublesome. For example, if the parent becomes incapacitated, the partnership will
dissolve. See HENKEL, supra note 14, § 16.02[1][a][ii]. More than one general partner,
however, also has disadvantages. Any general partner can bind the partnership, and more
than one control person can lead to disagreement over the affairs of the business. Also,
each general partner will be liable for the obligations of the partnership. See HENKEL,
supra note 14, § 16.02[1]. Cf HENKEL, supra note 14, § 16.02[1][e][iii] (noting the difficul-
ties unique to using an LLC as general partner). These factors (and others) must be con-
sidered prior to formation of the partnership.
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and the lack of management rights, combined with continuity of life, re-
duce the marketability of the partnership interest.130 Thus, the gross es-
tate will be valued at a lessor amount because the partnership units have
a lower value than the underlying assets in the partnership.
But the limited partnership still has two disadvantages: (1) the full per-
sonal liability of the general partner 131 and (2) the potential for liability
exposure to a limited partner that exercises too much control over the
business. 132 For example, such liability can come in the form of lawsuits
from employees, customers, creditors, regulators, or anyone else who
might have a cause of action.133 General partners may also be sued by
the limited partners if the limited partnership is not as successful as prom-
ised.134 Thus, these two disadvantages are serious flaws with the limited
partnership form.135
4. Close Corporations136
For many years, corporation law paid little attention to closely held
130. This must be done according to the Code's valuation rules in Chapter 14. See
I.R.C. §§ 2701-04 (1999); see also HENKEL, supra note 14, § 16.03; Bowen & Bailey, supra
note 122, at 333-36; Edwin T. Hood et al., Valuation of Closely Held Business Interests, 65
UMKC L. REV. 399, 479-83 (1997); D. John Thornton & Gregory A. Byron, Valuation of
Family Limited Partnership Interests, 32 IDAHO L. Rev. 345 (1996).
131. See RULPA, supra note 108, § 403. Some states have attempted to lessen the
liability risks associated with the limited partnership. For example, some states give gen-
eral partners limited liability through their LLLP statute, but only a few states have this
option. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-64-1001 to 1010 (West 1999); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 17-214 (Supp. 1996). See generally ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIB-
STEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS AND THE REVISED
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 5.01-5.05 (1998) [hereinafter BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON
LLPs]; Keatinge et al., Limited Liability Partnerships, supra note 13, at 196-207. Also,
practitioners will often protect the general partner by forming an S Corporation or single-
member LLC, each of which give the general partner liability protection and pass-through
taxation. See Bowen & Bailey, supra note 122, at 309-10; Alan Waldman, New Statute
Brings Benefits to Real Estate Companies, L.A. Bus. J., Oct. 24, 1994, at A-17; see also
supra notes 42-48. But these are, nevertheless, stop-gap measures to make the limited
partnership accommodate the business purposes of the entity.
132. See UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP Acr, § 7 (1916), 6A U.LA. 336 (1995) [hereinafter
ULPA]. Although the RULPA increased the control limited partners can exert without
jeopardizing their liability protections, the limited partners are nevertheless still limited in
their ability to control the affairs of the business. See RULPA, supra note 108, § 303.
133. See Executive Risk Reintroduces Its GP Liability Policy, NATI'L UNDERWRITER
(Property & Casualty/Risk & Benefits Management Edition) Sept. 1, 1997, at 17.
134. See id.
135. But Professor Bernard Black has argued that the limited partnership's inertia may
keep it on the books well into the future, despite its disadvantages. See Check-the-Box and
Beyond, supra note 6, at 611.
136. There is disagreement over the precise definition of the close corporation. One
view proposes that the close corporation is one which the "management and ownership are
substantially identical to the extent that it is unrealistic to believe that the judgment of the
directors will be independent of that of the stockholders." Symposium, The Close
Corporation, 52 Nw. U. L. REv. 345, 345 (1957) [hereinafter Symposium]. Another view
defines the critical attributes of a close corporation as "(1) a small number of stockholders;
(2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder
participation .... Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d
505, 511 (Mass. 1975). Others have focused on the lack of a public market for the
corporation's stock, thereby focusing on "iliquidity." See Steven C. Bahls, Resolving
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enterprises and focused instead on much larger businesses. 137 Before the
1940s, small corporations that varied their corporate structure by agree-
ment to meet their unique needs were often unable to enforce such
agreements in court. 138 The close corporation was one of the first at-
tempts to combine the favorable characteristics of partnership law with
corporation law.139 Limited liability, and at one time favorable federal
taxation,140 attracted closely-held firms to the corporate form.141 But
closely-held firms preferred "to retain internally the partnership form of
doing business. 142
Beginning in the 1940s and 1950s, states began to develop special rules
within corporation statutes for corporations with few shareholders. 143
Many states amended their state's general corporation statute, "ostensi-
bly available to all corporations, but of the greatest use to close corpora-
tions." 4 Some states chose to create an independent statute specifically
available to the close corporation.'45
One undesirable quality of traditional corporation law for the close
corporation was the unrestricted transfer of interests:
146
Whereas the owners of close corporations are prepared to accept as
good the "permanence" of the corporation and the fact that the
death or incapacity of any of them does not bring about its dissolu-
tion, they are quite unwilling to accept the free transferability of cor-
porate stock whereby strangers may be foisted upon them.'
47
Restrictions on the transfer of interests are of vital importance to close
corporations. "[B]ecause of the coalescence between ownership and
management, it is necessary that each close-incorporator have the utmost
confidence in the integrity and business judgment of his fellow sharehold-
Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285,
288-89 n.23 (1990). While a precise definition is perhaps unattainable, each attempt sheds
light on the characteristics of a close corporation.
137. See 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORA-
TIONS: LAW AND PRACrICE § 1.13 (3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORA-
TIONS]. In fact, courts treated with hostility those close corporations that attempted to
modify the traditional corporate rules. "[Partners that incorporate] cannot be partners
inter sese and a corporation as to the rest of the world." Jackson v. Hooper, 75 A. 568, 571
(NJ. 1910).
138. See O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 137, § 1.13.
139. See id.; Symposium, supra note 136, at 347-52; see also ROHRLICH, supra note 90,
§ 2A.03.
140. Prior to the 1980s, the corporate equity was often preferable from a tax perspec-
tive. Tax reform throughout the 1980s, however, virtually eliminated the desirability of the
corporate form from a tax perspective. See O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note
137, § 1.13. Certain close corporations, however, could still qualify for an S election, which
would tax the shareholders on a flow-through basis. See supra text accompanying notes 42-
48.
141. See O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 137, § 1.13.
142. ROHRLICH, supra note 90, § 2A.03.
143. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (1991). Some of the first states to do so
were Illinois, Indiana, and New York. See Symposium, supra note 136, at 348 n.12.
144. O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 137, § 1.13.
145. See id.
146. See id. § 1.14.
147. ROHRLICH, supra note 90, § 2A.04.
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ers."'1 48 Also, shareholders of the close corporation will be wary of com-
petitors purchasing stock or one shareholder purchasing a majority of
outstanding shares. 149
Authorization of share transfer restrictions is one of the more common
adjustments made to corporate law in an effort to accommodate close
corporations. 150 Many states view restricted transferability as an essential
element to qualify as a close corporation. 51 In fact, most states modified
their general corporation law to provide for transferability. 52 For exam-
ple, Maryland's close corporation statute restricts transferability as a de-
fault rule.' 53
Centralized management by a board of directors is another traditional
rule that was inconsistent with close corporations because it conflicted
with the interests of minority shareholders. 154 For example, in the event
of disagreement, a minority shareholder may not be able to effectively
protect himself next to a shareholder who owns a majority of stock. 155
Also, many investors in close corporations anticipate being employed by
the corporation, 156 and employment decisions are often left to the discre-
tion of centralized management, with the protections of the business
judgment rule.157 "Statutes in all states now permit participants in close
corporations to depart from the statutory norm and restrict the central-
ized control of directors."'1 58
In addition to the preceding examples, states have also added provi-
sions that modify continuity of life and allow remedies for dissension. 159
Also, many states have relaxed the requirements of traditional corporate
formalities. 160
Despite the accommodations states have made, the close corporation
presents unnecessary complexities for the practitioner, as well as unset-
tling risks for the client. A businessperson is straddled with the burden of
"costly and detailed planning" required in conforming the closely held
148. ld. at § 2A.07.
149. See id.
150. See O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 137, § 1.14. In the close corpora-
tion, restrictions on transferability were seen as a restraint on alienation. In fact, no juris-
diction allows for an absolute restriction on transferability. See 1 WILLIAM H. PAINTER,
PAINTER ON CLOSE CORPORATIONS: CORPORATE, SECURITIES, AND TAX ASPECTS § 3.1.1
(3d ed. 1997) [hereinafter PAINTER ON CLOSE CORPORATIONS]. As such, shareholders in a
close corporation must make the restriction reasonable. See id. § 3.1.2.
151. See ROHRLICH, supra note 90, § 2A.07.
152. See O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 137, § 1.14.
153. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'WS § 4-501 (1993). See generally
O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 137, § 1.14.
154. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1991 & Supp. 1998).




159. See id. § 1.16; see also infra text accompanying notes 296-98.
160. See O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 137, § 1.17.
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company to the corporate form. 161 Even after expensive lawyer bills, the
client could still face disastrous consequences:
[Where] planning is imperfect, as it so often is in closely held firms,
the standard corporate default rules are ready to strike. Unwary mi-
nority members may be frozen into an economically inferior posi-
tion. The cure for this may be worse than the disease-subjecting
the firm to ad hoc judicial remedies that tend to ignore the deals the
parties actually have made.162
The costs and risks, including the threat of possible double taxation,163
associated with the close corporation make the form less desirable to
many closely held firms.164
5. Limited Liability Partnerships
Several states created the limited liability partnership (LLP) in the
wake of the savings and loan scandals. 165 The federal government,
through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Res-
olution Trust Corporation (RTC), was looking for deep pockets to pay
the costs associated with these thrift scandals.166 Law and accounting
firms were the favorite targets for many of the federal lawsuits. 167 Subse-
quently, across the country innocent partners in professional firms were
held liable for the acts of guilty partners within their firms. 168
161. Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence of the Limited Liability Company, 51 Bus. LAW.
1, 2-3 (1995) [hereinafter Ribstein, Emergence of the LLC]. Much confusion exists be-
tween lawyers and non-lawyers concerning the requirements to become a close corpora-
tion. One observer noted that "many lawyers mistakenly believe they may have to elect
close corporation status to be eligible to elect the tax status provided by Subchapter S...
or believe they have to elect such status to come within the 'short form' exemption of the
California securities law." O'NEA's CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 137, § 1.19.
162. Ribstein, Emergence of the LLC, supra note 161, at 2-3.
163. Many firms can get flow-through taxation via subchapter S, but not all firms will
qualify. See supra text accompanying notes 42 to 48. While the S election may be available
for most small firms, such firms still run the risk of "blowing" the S election. One way this
has happened is in the case where a corporation is financed through both debt and equity.
If a court were to hold that a debt instrument is actually equity, see, e.g., Portage Plastics
Co., Inc. v. United States, 486 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1973); Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United
States, 398 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1968), the corporation will have two classes of stock, which
will disqualify the corporation from using the S election. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D)
(1999). Although Congress and the Treasury have recently provided safe harbors for cor-
porate debt, this issue underscores one of the S corporation's historical and fundamental
flaws. See I.R.C. § 1361(c)(5) (1999); Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(1) (as amended in 1995).
164. See Larry E. Ribstein, The New Choice of Entity for Entrepreneurs, 26 CAP. U.L.
REV. 325, 331 (1997) [hereinafter Ribstein, New Choice of Entity] ("In the wake of the
development of the LLC and the LLP and 'check-the-box' rule there is a new rule of
thumb for entrepreneurs who are considering whether to incorporate: Don't.").
165. See BROMBERG & RIBSrEIN ON LLPs, supra note 131, § 1.01(a).
166. See Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at
Birth (Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (1995).
167. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON LLPs, supra note 131, § 1.01(a).
168. See, e.g., M. A. Dornbush, A Flood of Litigation: Liability Suits Add Up on Ac-
countants, 12 AUSTIN Bus. J. 9 (1992) (reporting that liability for the nation's accounting
firms was adding up: Coopers & Lybrand, $200 million; Arthur Andersen, $22 million;
Ernst & Young, $63 million; not to mention legal fees and other costs that would be passed
on to partners if the partnership money runs out).
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Texas law and accounting firms were hit especially hard. 169 It is not
surprising that in 1991 Texas was the first to create an LLP statute, 170
which limited partners' liability to their investment in the organization.
The statute provided a "partial shield" that limited innocent partners' lia-
bility for errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance of
other partners. 171 While the Texas statute only covered tort liability, by
1993 several states promulgated LLP statutes extending the liability
shield to tort and contract liability.172
Today, all fifty states and Washington D. C. have LLP statutes, 173 and
LLP liability protections still vary from state-to-state.1 74 Generally, there
are three flavors of liability protection in the LLP.175 First, there is a pure
negligence approach, protecting innocent partners from claims of mal-
practice of other partners in the LLP.176 Second is the tort and contract
approach, which protects innocent partners from claims sounding in tort
or contract.' 77 Third is the vicarious liability approach, which removes
partners' vicarious liability for all types of claims.' 78 Most states adhere
169. See Hamilton, supra note 166, at 1069 ("More than one-third of all the bank fail-
ures in the United States [during the 1980s] occurred in Texas.").
170. See TEXAS UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr, ch. 901, § 84, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 3161.
171. See generally BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON LLPs, supra note 131, §§ 1.01-.02 (pro-
viding a history of the development of the LLP); Hamilton, supra note 166, at 1069 (dis-
cussing the history of Texas' LLP statute).
172. Louisiana provided liability protection that included intentional and willful mis-
conduct. See BROMBERO & RiBsMIN ON LLPs, supra note 131, § 1.01. Delaware enlarged
the liability shield to cover wrongful acts, misconduct, and negligence. See id. By 1994,
Delaware limited both tort and contract liability. See id.
173. As of the writing of this Comment, there are 46 states and the District of Columbia
that have LLP statutes. Arkansas, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wyoming do not have LLP
statutes. See id. § 1.01(e).
174. See Bruce P. Ely & Christopher R. Grissom, The LLC/LLP Scorecard, 98 TNT
225-72, Nov. 23, 1998, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, TNT File; see also Keatinge
et al., Limited Liability Partnerships, supra note 13, at 175-80; BROMBERO & RmsrEiN ON
LLPs, supra note 131, § 3.
175. See Keatinge et al., Limited Liability Partnerships, supra note 13, at 175-80.
176. See, e.g., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b § 3.08(a)(1) (West 1998); see gener-
ally Erickson & Sanders, supra note 60, at 1014-17.
Five exceptions exist to the limit on liability [in the Texas LLP]. First, a part-
ner remains liable if he directly supervises another partner or representative
who commits the "error or omission." . . . Second, a partner is liable if he or
she is directly involved in the specific activity where another partner or rep-
resentative commits the "errors or omissions." ... Third, a partner is liable if
he had notice or knowledge of the misconduct at the time of the occurrence
and then "failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or cure" the miscon-
duct .... Fourth, partners remain liable for debts and obligations other than
"errors and omissions" of partners and representatives.... Fifth, even if the
"errors and omissions" of one partner preclude another partner from being
held liable, the partnership itself is not protected.
Id.; see also Keatinge et al., Limited Liability Partnerships, supra note 13, at 175-78.
177. See Keatinge et al., Limited Liability Partnerships, supra note 13, at 178-79; see,
e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 50-15(B) (Michie 1998).
178. See Keatinge et al., Limited Liability Partnerships, supra note 13, at 179-80; see,
e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 15018(b) (West Supp. 1999). Cf BROMBERG & RIBMSTEIN ON
LLPs, supra note 131, § 3.03.
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to the latter two approaches. 179
Professor Ribstein has argued that the LLP is well suited for profes-
sional firms.' 80 First, the LLP's liability shield conforms with the needs of
professional firms. 181 Second, unlike the limited partnership, LLC,182
and corporation, which limit distributions, the LLP allows professional
firms to pay out all firm income to the partners.'8 3
But the LLP form is a good example of the duplication and confusion
that exists in business formation.1 84 The LLP was a creation of the state
legislatures to meet an immediate need facing law and accounting
firms.'8 5 In the current situation, however, the LLP is unnecessary. In
fact, it is "a step backward from LLCs because, as a general partnership,
it still (i) has the shortcomings of a general partnership, (ii) must have
two members, (iii) must be organized to carry on a business for profit,
and (iv) is, of business organizations, the most susceptible to
dissolution."'1 86
6. Limited Liability Companies
The history of the LLC demonstrates how closely states have tracked
federal tax laws in creating new business entities. In 1977, Wyoming was
the first state to pass an LLC statute; 8 7 in 1982, Florida followed.188 But
179. See Keatinge et al., Limited Liability Partnerships, supra note 13, at 178-80; BROM-
BERG & RIBsTEIN ON LLPs, supra note 131, Table 3-1.
180. See Ribstein, New Choice of Entity, supra note 164.
181. See id.
182. See, eg., N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 508(a) (McKinney Supp. 1999). The New
York LLC limits distributions in the following manner:
A limited liability company shall not make a distribution to a member to the
extent that, at the time of the distribution, after giving effect to the distribu-
tion, all liabilities of the limited liability company, other than liabilities to
members on account of their membership interests and liabilities for which
recourse of creditors is limited to specified property of the limited liability
company, exceed the fair market value of the assets of the limited liability
company, except that the fair market value of property that is subject to a
liability for which the recourse of creditors is limited shall be included in the
assets of the limited liability company only to the extent that the fair value of
such property exceeds such liability.
Id. See also LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (1992) [hereinafter RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LLCs].
183. See Ribstein, New Choice of Entity, supra note 164, at 336. Cf. BROMBERG &
RIBSTEIN ON LLPs, supra note 131, § 4.04(d); Hamilton, supra note 166, at 1098-99.
184. See Ribstein, New Choice of Entity, supra note 164, at 335-36.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 131 to 138. Also, political expediency may be
one reason the LLP statute developed the way it did. In Texas, for example, it was much
easier to pass limited liability language that mirrored the language in the Texas Profes-
sional Corporation Act. See Keatinge et al., Limited Liability Partnerships, supra note 13,
at 175-78. Such language was familiar and was not as controversial. See id.
186. Id. at 207.
187. See Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 158, § 1
(codified at Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-101 to -136 (Michie 1997)).
188. See Florida Limited Liability Company Act, 1982 Fla. Laws ch. 82-177, § 2 (codi-
fied at FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401 to .471).
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few LLCs in either state were actually formed.189 In 1988, the Service
issued Revenue Ruling 88-76, which stated that the Service would treat
the Wyoming LLC as a partnership for tax purposes. 19° Confirming the
demand for a business form with limited liability, flexibility, and
favorable federal taxation, Revenue Ruling 88-76 prompted several states
to generate LLC statutes. 191 Beginning in 1990, Colorado, 92 Kansas,193
and Indiana' 94 passed LLC statutes.195 In 1991, Virginia, 96 Utah, 197
Texas, 198 and Nevada' 99 enacted LLC statutes.2°° As states enacted LLC
statutes, each state had a significant number of filings each year thereaf-
ter.201 "The explosion of LLC law in the few years since 1988 confirm[ed]
not only the importance of the tax endorsement, but also the existence of
a strong pent-up demand for this form of business. '' 2°2 Today all fifty
states and Washington D.C. have LLC statutes. 20 3
The LLC is the best-of-all-worlds business form. Members in an LLC
have limited liability;204 the check-the-box regulations allow the LLC to
choose flow-through taxation;20 5 and the LLC contains flexible firm man-
agement, transferability of interest, and dissolution rules. As for firm
management, some LLC statutes provide a default rule that the LLC be
run by managers,2°6 others have member-managed LLC default rules
(managers can be selected by agreement),20 7 and still others require the
189. In fact, prior to 1982 no other state had passed an LLC act and in 1988 there were
only twenty-six LLCs in Wyoming. See Joseph P. Fonfara & Corey R. McCool, Comment,
The Wyoming Limited Liability Company: A Viable Alternative to the S Corporation and
Limited Partnership?, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 523, 523 (1988).
190. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
191. See generally Keatinge et al., A Study of the Emerging Entity, supra note 56, at 381-
84.
192. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 7-80-101 to -1101 (West Supp. 1999).
193. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to -7650 (1995 & Supp. 1998).
194. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-1-1 to -19 (Michie 1999).
195. See generally Keatinge et al., A Study of the Emerging Entity, supra note 56, at 423-
31 (comparing LLC statutes of several states).
196. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1069 (Michie 1993).
197. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-101 to -156 (1998 & Supp. 1999).
198. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, arts. 1.01-9.02 (West Supp. 1999).
199. See NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.011 to .571 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1997).
200. See generally Keatinge et al., A Study of the Emerging Entity, supra note 56, at 423-
41.
201. See supra note 8.
202. Ribstein, Emergence of the LLC, supra note 161, at 4.
203. See Powers & Forry, supra note 63, at 856-58
204. RIBsrEIN & KEATINGE ON LLCs, supra note 182, § 12.01 ("All the LLC statutes
explicitly provide that neither the members nor managers of an LLC are liable for debts,
obligations, or other liabilities of the LLC."); see, e.g., Wyo. STA-. ANN. § 17-15-113
(Michie 1997) ("Neither the members of a limited liability company nor the managers of a
limited liability company managed by a manager or managers are liable under a judgment,
decree or order of a court, or in any other manner for a debt, obligation or liability of the
limited liability company.").
205. See supra text accompanying notes 31-41 and 64-82.
206. See, e.g., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 2.12 (West 1997); see also John
D. Jackson & Alan W. Tompkins, Corporations and Limited Liability Companies, 47 SMU
L. REv. 901, 924-25 (1994).
207. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (Supp. 1996); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW
§ 401 (McKinney Supp. 1999); CAL. CORP. CODE § 17150 (West Supp. 1998).
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organization to choose its management structure in the articles of organi-
zation.208 Most LLC statutes require that the LLC dissolve if one of the
members dies, retires, resigns, or declares bankruptcy,20 9 but some stat-
utes have recently deleted such dissolution provisions. 210 Additionally,
many LLC statutes have a default rule that restricts transferability. Many
of these default rules require unanimous l1 or majority-in-interest 212 con-
sent before a member is permitted to transfer a control interest in the
LLC.213 Thus, the LLC has combined favorable corporate characteristics
with favorable partnership characteristics.
Thousands of individual LLCs now exist in all fifty states.214 But there
is still some hesitancy among practicing lawyers to recommend the LLC.
Uncertainty as to the rules of fiduciary duty,21 5 uncertainty as to whether
an LLC interest is a security,216 a lack of uniformity from state-to-state,
208. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-401 (West Supp. 1998); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 48-205-101(7) (1995).
209. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-245-101(5) (1995); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 1528n, art. 6.01(5) (West 1997); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-123(a)(iii) (Michie 1999);
N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1999).
210. See, e.g., Colo. Laws 1997, S.B. 97-233, § 20, effective June 3, 1997.
211. See, e.g., ALA. CODE. § 10-12-31 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.165 (Michie 1998);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1332 (West 1994).
212. See, eg., CAL- CORP. CODE § 17303 (West Supp. 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.432
(West Supp. 1999); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 604 (McKinney Supp. 1998).
213. Financial interests, however, are transferable. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 7-80-702 (West Supp. 1998); CAL. CORP. CODE § 17301 (West Supp. 1999); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
214. As early as 1993 businesses were catching on to the LLC as a flexible form of
business. See John R. Emshwiller, New Kind of Company Attracts Many-Some Legal,
Some Not, WALL STREET J., Nov. 8, 1993 at B1. Since then, LLC have increased in popu-
larity. In California, LLC filings have consistently risen since California passed its LLC
Act in 1994. In 1994, 977 LLCs were created; in 1995, 7,396; in 1996, 12,151; in 1997, 17,932;
and in 1998 (as of January 31), 2,029. See Telephone Interview with California Secretary of
State (February 17, 1998) (on file with author). In Delaware, the total number of LLCs in
existence rose from 21,619 to 42,266 in 1997. See Telephone Interview with Delaware Sec-
retary of State (February 20, 1998) (on file with author).
215. See Michael Hampton Boles & Susan Pace Hamill, Agency Powers and Fiduciary
Duties Under the Alabama Limited Liability Company Act: Suggestions for Future Reform,
48 ALA. L. REV. 143, 145-6 (1996) [hereinafter Boles & Hamill]; RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON
LLCs, supra note 182, §§ 9.01-9.11.
216. Unless Congress names LLC interests in Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933,
the definition of "investment contract" will determine whether an LLC interest is a secur-
ity. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1994). In SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), the
Supreme Court pronounced a four-part test for "investment contracts":
[Ain investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract,
transaction or scheme whereby a person [1] invests his money [2] in a com-
mon enterprise and [3] is led to expect profits [4] solely from the efforts of
the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the
enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the
physical assets employed in the enterprise.
W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 298-99.
Several commentators have argued that an LLC interest is a security interest. See John
A. Peralta, Limited Liability Company Interests as Securities, 1 ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 29,
36 (1993); Marc I. Steinberg & Karen L. Conway, The Limited Liability Company as a
Security, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1105 (1992). For others that have argued that an LLC is pre-
sumptively not a security see Carol R. Goforth, Why Limited Liability Company Member-
ship Interests Should Not Be Treated as Securities and Possible Steps to Encourage this
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and a general lack of case law and experience with the LLC present valid
concerns to the practitioner who does not want to make his client a test
case.217 Further, in states like Texas, LLC's are subject to state franchise
taxes.218 Nevertheless, many business organizers have found the LLC de-
sirable and are willing to take on some risk in return for the LLC's flexi-
bility and favorable taxation.219
III. THE THREE-STATUTE MODEL
The general partnership, limited partnership, LLP, and close corpora-
tions each have considerable problems. Federal taxation is often the
cause of these problems. However, federal taxation should no longer dic-
tate business formation decisions because the check-the-box regulations
allow total flexibility. These regulations enable each state's law makers
to simplify business enterprises statutes.220 Hence, states can cater more
Result, 45 HASTINGS L. 1223 (1994); Larry E. Ribstein, Form and Substance in the Defini-
tion of a "Security". The Case of Limited Liability Companies, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
807 (1994) [hereinafter Ribstein, Form and Substance]; MARK A. SARGENTr, LiMrrED LIA-
BILrrY COMPANY HANDBOOK, ch. 3 (1993-94); Mark A. Sargent, Are Limited Liability
Company Interests Securities?, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1069 (1992). Still others have argued for a
case-by-case approach, see Thomas E. Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability Company:
A Basic Comparative Primer (Part II), 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 467,510-18 (1992); Elaine A.
Welle, Limited Liability Company Interests as Securities: An Analysis of Federal and State
Actions Against Limited Liability Companies Under the Securities Laws, 73 DENY. U. L.
REV. 425 (1996).
State statutes could help resolve some of this debate. For example, California creates
the presumption that an LLC interest is a security:
"Security" means any... membership in an incorporated or unincorporated
association;... interest in a limited liability company and any class or series
of such interests (including any fractional or other interest in such interest),
except a membership interest in a limited liability company in which the per-
son claiming this exception can prove that all of the members are actively
engaged in the management of the limited liability company; provided that
evidence that members vote or have the right to vote, or the right to informa-
tion concerning the business and affairs of the limited liability company, or
the right to participate in management, shall not establish, without more, that
all members are actively engaged in the management of the limited liability
company...
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (West Supp. 1998).
217. See Check-the-Box and Beyond, supra note 6, at 618 ([William R. Asbell] sug-
gesting that practicing lawyers "tend to recommend those things that have a body of estab-
lished law behind them."); Oesterle & Gazur, supra note 6, at 121. Also, third parties may
be slow to do business with LLCs. Creditors, for instance, may hesitate because of unclear
agency laws in the LLC. See Gerald J. Kehoe et al., Lending to Limited Liability Compa-
nies, 10 CoM. LENDING REV. 4, 4-13 (1995). LLCs will bear the cost from third parties'
hesitancy to do business with the LLC. See Ribstein, Emergence of the LLC, supra note
161, at 12.
218. See TEx. TAx CODE ANN. § 171.001(a)(1), (b)(2) (West 1992); see generally Erick-
son & Sanders, supra note 60, at 1006; Kathryn A. Pischak, State Issues Complicate the
Decision to Do Business as a Limited Liability Company, 83 J. TAx'N 76, 76-79 (1995).
The franchise tax rates are the greater of 25% of net taxable capital or 4.5% of net
taxable earned surplus. See TEx. TAx CODE ANN. § 171.002 (West 1992).
219. See supra notes 8 and 214.
220. Several commentators have suggested states use the check-the-box regulations as a
catalyst to create a more simplified business enterprises statutory scheme. See Check-the-
Box and Beyond, supra note 6, (discussing various options for the future of state corporate
and limited liability codes); Loewenstein, supra note 20 (proposing a two-statute approach:
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closely to the needs of business associations, investors, and the general
public.
This proposal suggests that state legislatures and bar organizations fo-
cus on three forms of organization. First, the general partnership should
remain an ideal form for informal ventures where the parties have failed
to make a state filing.2 21 Second, the traditional corporation serves pub-
licly traded companies well by providing predictability and consistency
from state-to-state.222 Third, the LLC's contractarian nature can be ex-
panded to meet the needs of the close corporation, limited partnership,
LLP, and other miscellaneous business forms. Aside from a few
mandatory rules, the LLC should remain a highly flexible, contractarian
business form with protective default rules that can be altered in the op-
erating agreement.
This section discusses changes that should be made to each of the these
three forms. Both corporations and partnerships have a well-developed
body of law and need few changes. The LLC, however, is still developing.
Thus, the discussion that follows gives little emphasis to corporations and
general partnerships, but much attention is given to LLCs.
A. CORPORATIONS
For most of its history, the corporation has been replete with rules like
duty of loyalty and dissenters' rights, which may not be altered by agree-
ment.2 2 Recently, mandatory rules have been challenged, both theoreti-
cally and practically, by those who argue that corporate statutes should
take a contractarian focus. 224 Proponents of more enabling corporate
statutes suggest that the corporation is merely a "nexus of contracts." 2
They argue that corporation statutes should provide a set of "off-the-
rack" terms that the parties could contract around, instead of mandatory
rules. 22
6
Opponents of the contractarian approach (the "anti-contractarians")
argue for mandatory rules to ensure shareholders are adequately pro-
the traditional corporation with mandatory provisions and a limited liability entity that is
largely contractarian in approach); Oesterle & Gazur, supra note 6, at 102-03 (proposing a
three-prong approach to small business statutes: (1) "limited liability partnerships;" (2)
"close companies;" and (3) "private corporations"). Other commentators have used the
check-the-box regulations to recommend changes that should take place in specific LLC
statutes. See Susan Kalinka, The Limited Liability Company Law After "Check-the-Box,"
57 LA. L. REv. 715 (1997) (suggesting reform of Louisiana's LLC statute); Powers & Forry,
supra note 63 (evaluating the Wyoming LLC and making suggestions for the future).
221. See Oesterle & Gazur, supra note 6, at 116-18.
222. See Loewenstein, supra note 20, at 456.
223. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1396-99 (1989).
224. See id.; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1416 (1989) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel].
225. Id. at 1426-28; Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corpo-
rations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fishel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449 (1989).
226. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 224, 1444-46.
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tected.227 They say that "bargaining among the shareholders, or between
managers and the shareholders as a body, is virtually impossible. Accord-
ingly, most of the constitutive rules of such corporations are determined
not by contract, but by law .. . .,228 But contractarians insist that such
mandatory rules impede the corporation's ability to remain flexible and
thereby competitive.22 9
Professor Mark J. Loewenstein is critical of extremists in both
camps. 230 He has suggested that mandatory provisions in corporate
codes should remain intact, while the "contractarian viewpoint ought to
find its expression in alternatives to incorporation."' 31 Thus, corporate
statutes should retain a core set of mandatory rules. Minority protections
like dissenters' rights and the duties of loyalty and care are good exam-
ples of what should be mandatory in the corporate form.232 Directors
and shareholders should not be able to waive these protections by agree-
ment. This way, the investing public will continue to know what to expect
when they buy stock in a corporation and how they will be protected if
things go wrong.233 Furthermore, if states make the LLC desirable to
closely held corporations, they can distinctly focus on the needs of pub-
licly held companies privately held companies separately. Such focus will
stop the "spillover" effect that has occurred over the last several years.234
The three-statute approach in this proposal contemplates Professor
Loewenstein's view of the corporation.235 As the LLC replaces the close
corporation,236 states will find it easier to focus on the needs of large and
publicly held corporations, and their shareholders, when amending its
corporation law.
B. GENERAL PARTNERSHIPS
Among the three proposed entities, unlimited liability of partners will
frequently make the general partnership the most undesirable. But there
is a segment of the public that will engage in business without considering
227. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1471-1515 (1989) (arguing for mandatory rules').
228. See id.
229. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 224, at 1427-28 ("The structure suited to a
dynamic, growing firm such as Xerox in 1965 is quite unsuited to Exxon in 1965 (or to
Xerox in 1989).").
230. See Loewenstein, supra note 20, at 465-66.
231. Id. at 471.
232. See id.
233. See generally 1 PAINTER ON CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 150, §§ 1.4, 3.1.2.
234. See Ian Ayers, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U.L.Q.
365, 395 n.124 (1992).
235. Professor Loewenstein's argument is consistent with this proposal to the extent
that the corporation should have mandatory rules. But his approach is not adopted here to
the extent that he proposes total waiver of fiduciary duties in the LLC. See Loewenstein,
supra note 20, at 471.
236. Professor Ribstein has speculated that "the LLC phenomenon could spell the end
of the close corporation business form." Ribstein, Theories and Evidence from LLCs,
supra note 10, at 431. This proposal not only suggests that the close corporation could be
replaced by the LLC but that as a practical matter it should be.
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forming an entity under state law.237 The broad language of the Uniform
Partnership Act only requires (1) two or more people with (2) intent to
associate (3) to carry on a business (4) for a profit.2 38 As such, the gen-
eral partnership should continue to function as a catch-all form of busi-
ness association for those who choose not to file with the state.239
This form is necessary to protect third parties that do business with the
informal partnership. For example, under general partnership law, a
third-party creditor can hold both partners liable for a recourse loan to
the partnership. 240 This form is also necessary to protect the general
partners themselves. Well-established case law gives general partners a
rightful expectation that their co-partners will have "the punctilio of an
honor most sensitive" as a standard guiding their conduct.241 Thus, gen-
eral partnership law is still necessary to protect these (and other)
interests.
C. A VISION FOR LLC STATUTES
In order for this simplified structure to work, LLCs must be designed
to cater to all business organizations that are not corporations or general
partnerships (e.g., limited partnership, LLP, LLLP, close corporation).
Thus, the LLC must remain highly flexible.
The focus and purpose of the LLC has been to create a flexible statute
that allows parties to form a customized business entity. Thus far, the
primary constraint upon LLC statutes and operating agreements has been
federal taxation. Now that the LLC can be developed whichever way the
state would like, the inclination may be to create a "blank screen" ap-
proach. That is, the state offers an entity the ability to get limited liability
with few, if any, restrictions. Many times, however, this approach will cut
too much into a state's ability to protect the public. This Section suggests
that the preferred approach is to adopt default rules that can be easily
changed in an LLC's operating agreement.
1. The "Default Rule" Approach
Professor Ribstein has argued that default rules are unnecessary since
rational actors "take into account the fact that they are not well informed
and knowledgeable. a242 He would design an LLC with few default rules
237. See Oesterle & Gazur, supra note 6, at 117.
238. See UPA supra note 97, § 6; see also supra note 75.
239. See Oesterle & Gazur, supra note 6, at 117.
240. See, e.g., Minute Made Corp. v. United Foods, 291 F.2d 577 (N.Y. 5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 928 (1961). Cf Martin v. Peyton, 158 N.E. 77 (1927). See generally BROM-
BERG & RiBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP, supra note 100, § 2.14.
241. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928); see also Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515-16 (Mass. 1975). See, e.g.,
Gaines v. Hamman, 358 S.W.2d 557, 560-61 (Tex. 1962).
242. Robert W. Hamilton & Larry E. Ribstein, The Future of the Unincorporated Firm,




since rational actors will become informed and make decisions
accordingly.
But this proposal argues for the adoption of a comprehensive set of
default rules. A flexible LLC statute is preferable, and maybe even es-
sential, for a state to be competitive with other states.2 43 Thus, instead of
the "blank screen" approach, states should prefer a statute with several
default rules that will protect members who are in the minority and par-
ties that choose not to use legal counsel when forming an LLC.244
While LLC statutes should have default rules, it is not because the state
should favor parties who proceed without consulting a competent lawyer.
Nor should states impose cumbersome rules on sophisticated parties.
Rather, under the LLC formation theory, as proposed here, the relative
cost of default rules to a sophisticated businessperson is low-they may
simply write an operating agreement that changes the default rule. The
cost savings, however, to the unsophisticated business person could be
quite high.2 45
Thus, in order to keep the LLC form flexible, each default rule should
be preceded by "unless otherwise agreed" language, or the entire LLC
statute should be preceded with a general provision that the operating
agreement governs the LLC with few exceptions.2 46 This would allow the
parties to contract around any default rule in the statute.
Under this approach, a less sophisticated party will either receive pro-
tection by default or will learn of the protection if the more sophisticated
party tries to put it in the operating agreement. Theoretically, the agree-
ment that ensues will more closely match the bargaining power of the
parties, instead of their relative legal sophistication.
243. See Powers & Forry, supra note 63, at 849-53 (calling for the Wyoming legislature
to act quickly and amend the LLC to create a more flexible entity, which would attract
companies to Wyoming and increase "revenue and notoriety for the State").
244. For a discussion on the value of protecting the unsophisticated public by default
rules, see Hamilton & Ribstein, supra note 242, at 690.
245. See Ribstein, Emergence of the LLC, supra note 161, at 2-3.
246. The Uniform Limited Liability Company Act has such a general provision. It
reads as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), all members of a limited
liability company may enter into an operating agreement, which need not be
in writing, to regulate the affairs of the company and the conduct of its busi-
ness, and to govern relations among the members, managers, and company.
To the extent the operating does not otherwise provide, this [Act] governs
relations among the members, managers, and company.
(b) The operating agreement may not:
(2) eliminate the duty of loyalty...
(3) unreasonably reduce the duty of care...
(4) eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing...
(5) vary the right to expel a member [because of wrongful conduct];
(7) restrict [the] rights of a person, other than a manager, member, and
transferee of a members' distributional interest, under this [Act].
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Acr § 103 (1995), 6A U.L.A. 425 (1995) [hereinafter ULLCA].
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This proposal argues for the inclusion of four statutory default rules:
restricted transferability of interest, member management, continuity of
life, and minority protections. Next, mandatory rules are discussed: fidu-
ciary duties and agency restrictions. Last, there is a discussion on when
liability should be imposed on LLC members and a suggestion that states
add statutory language on piercing the corporate veil.
2. Default Rule: Restricted Transferability of Interest
One of the undesirable effects of incorporation for close corporations is
free transferability of corporate stock.247 Restrictions on transferability
are often desirable in closely held firms due to the close connection be-
tween ownership and management.248 Indeed, the LLC was tailored to
the needs of closely held business association.249 Thus, LLC statutes
should retain a default rule that restricts transferability barring unani-
mous20 or majority-in-interest251 consent. This rule is an improvement
on the close corporation where transferability cannot be fully re-
stricted,252 and it still allows the LLC members to contract for
transferability.
But restrictions on transferability have been criticized, even before the
check-the-box regulations were announced.253 It has been argued that
such restrictions are unnecessary because LLC members have limited lia-
bility; therefore, "the transfer of management rights in an LLC is not the
sort of momentous event that it may be in a general partnership. '' 254 This
argument is flawed since close corporations, which have limited liability,
encountered the need to restrict transferability; the need for restriction
has not changed with the LLC.255 Also, a default rule ensures that par-
ties will not have a stranger forced upon them without specifically having
bargained for transferability in the operating agreement or without hav-
ing specifically approved the admittance of a new member.256
This rule would require the approval of a majority-in-interest of the
members to transfer.257 But parties to a transaction can then contract for
varying degrees of transferability. For example, some parties may choose
247. Shareholders in a close corporation are "quite unwilling to accept the free transfer-
ability of corporate state whereby strangers by be foisted upon them." ROHRLICH, supra
note 90, § 2A.04.
248. See ROHRUCH, supra note 90, § 2A.04.
249. See Keatinge et al., A Study of the Emerging Entity, supra note 56, at 378-81.
250. See, e.g., ALA. CODE. § 10-12-31(a)(1) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.165(a)
(Michie 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1332(a)(1) (West 1994).
251. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 17303(a) (West Supp. 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.432(1)(a) (West Supp. 1999); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 604(a) (McKinney 1999).
252. See supra notes 146-53.
253. See Ribstein, Emergence of the LLC, supra note 161, at 5-6, 14-15.
254. See id. at 15.
255. See O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 137, § 1.14; ROHRLICH, supra
note 90, § 2A.04.
256. See ROHRLICH, supra note 90, § 2A.03.
257. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 17303(a) (West Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.432 (West Supp. 1999); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 604 (McKinney 1999).
1999] 1769
SMU LAW REVIEW
to contract for right of first refusal258 or may put a buy-sell agreement in
the operating agreement.25 9 Others, however, may opt for a more restric-
tive provision that requires unanimous consent or the corporate standard
of complete transferability (i.e., no consent).26
3. Default Rule: Member Management
Another vestige of the Kintner classification rules is member manage-
ment.26' Most states have a default rule that requires the LLC be man-
aged by its members.2 62 LLCs are then permitted to elect manager
management as long as it is in the operating agreement 263 or articles of
organization.264 A member-managed LLC is analogous to the general
partnership, and a manager-managed LLC is analogous to a limited part-
nership or corporation.2 65
The check-the-box regulations allow states to structure the LLC even
more like a corporation by making the default rule manager-manage-
ment. Closely-held firms, however, generally prefer some form of mem-
ber management, and large firms can easily contract around this default
rule. Thus, since the default rules in this proposal are designed to protect
parties that will not seek legal counsel prior to forming an LLC, it would
be ill-advised for states to change the member-management default rule.
Moreover, those states that do not have such a default rule should amend
their statutes to provide for the member-management default.26
6
Similarly, the ability of LLCs to change their management structure is
beneficial. While limited liability and favorable taxation have been fun-
258. See Sorlie v. Ness, 323 N.W.2d 841, 846 (N.D. 1982).
259. See Hodges v. Pittman, 384 So. 2d 14, 16 (Ala. 1980).
260. Parties to an LLC that plan on perfecting exemptions under the Securities Act of
1933 (the "1933 Act") should be cautious that free transferability does not interfere with
those exemptions. For example, certain exemptions under Regulation D require that inter-
ests be restricted. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(d), 230.505, 230.506 (1999). Additionally, re-
sale restrictions are a material fact; therefore, they should be disclosed to comply with the
anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934
Act"). See 1 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEwis D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS
ON SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 4.2 (1997). Hence, the issuers should
follow the guidelines set forth in Rule 502(d): (1) make a reasonable inquiry as to whether
the purchaser is purchasing for his own purpose; (2) make a written disclosure that the
securities are not registered pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, and that the securities
may not be resold; and (3) clearly mark on the certificate or other document memorializing
the sale of the securities that the securities are not registered pursuant to the Securities Act
of 1933, and that the securities may not be resold. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (1999).
261. See supra note 59.
262. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 17150 (West Supp. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-
238-101 (1995). But see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.606 (West 1995): N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 10-32-69 (1995); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, 2.12(A) (West 1997).
263. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-11-
301, -304 (Harrison 1998).
264. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17150 -51 (West Supp. 1998). See generally Ribstein,
Emergence of the LLC, supra note 161, at 9-12.
265. See WHITMIRE, supra note 63, § 1.05(1) (suggesting LLCs look more like a limited
partnership when the managers must be members, but more like a corporation when man-
agers do not need to be owners).
266. See supra note 262.
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damental to the LLCs existence and growth, flexibility in the manage-
ment structure has also been instrumental in the LLC's popularity.267 As
such, member management should only be a default rule so that LLCs
can change their management structures in the operating agreement or
articles of organization.
4. Default Rule: Continuity of Life
Most LLC statutes provide that the LLC does not have continuity of
life.268 All states require dissolution if there is (1) written consent from
all members, (2) the happening of a contingency specified in the articles
of organization or operating agreement, or (3) a judicial dissolution.269
Most LLC statutes also require that, unless altered by agreement, an LLC
dissolves with the disassociation of a member or upon the happening of a
triggering event (e.g., death, retirement, resignation, expulsion, bank-
ruptcy, or dissolution of any member).270 Others have no such default
rule.27' Generally, if the LLC is dissolved, it can continue the enterprise
with consent of the members.27 2 Also, states allow LLCs to contract
around continuity of life.273 Several states, however, have begun repeal-
ing their statutes requiring dissolution upon the happening of a trigger
event.274
Professor Susan Pace Hamill has argued that states should incorporate
the RUPA's disassociation into the LLC and repeal the dissolution
267. See Ribstein, Emergence of the LLC, supra note 161, at 2. Professor Ribstein
states: "The LLC is best understood in terms of four general characteristics: (i) limited
liability; (ii) partnership tax features; (iii) chameleon management-that is, the ability to
choose between centralized and direct member-management; and (iv) creditor-protection
provisions." Id. (emphasis added).
268. See, e.g., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, 2.12 (West 1997); N.Y. LTD. LIAB.
Co. LAW § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-245-101 (1995).
269. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.400 (Michie 1994); CAL. CORP. CODE § 17350
(West 1998); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1999).
270. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE § 17350 (West 1998) (requiring dissolution if one of the
foregoing happens to a member of a member-managed LLC, but only to a manager of a
manager-managed LLC); DEL_ CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-801 (Supp. 1996); N.Y. LTD. LIAB.
Co. LAW § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1999).
271. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.400 (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-901
(Michie Supp. 1998).
272. States differ in their approach regarding the number of members required to con-
sent to the continuation of the enterprise. For instance, some LLC statutes require unani-
mous consent of the remaining members following the disassociation of a member. See,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.400 (Michie 1998). Others require consent of only the major-
ity-in-interest. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 17350 (West Supp. 1998); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 21-2621 (Supp. 1996); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1999). But most
provide that this is just a default rule, which can be circumvented by a provision in the
operating agreement or both the articles of organization and the operating agreement.
See, e.g., A-ASKA STAT. § 10.50.400 (Michie 1998); CAL. CORP. CODE § 17350 (West Supp.
1998); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2621
(1997).
273. While some states still require dissolution upon the traditional triggering events,
this is only a default rule and can be changed in the operating agreement or the articles of
incorporation.
274. See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-801 (West 1999).
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rules.275 She traced the rules in the general partnership and the close
corporation to analyze their competing policy considerations. Under the
Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), a dissenting partner may withdraw, and
the partner's withdrawal causes dissolution of the partnership.276 The
withdrawing partner's interest can be bought out by the remaining part-
ners or the assets of the partnership can be sold at a judicial sale.277 The
individual partners could wind up the partnership, or agree to continue
the venture in a succeeding partnership.27 8 Thus, a dissenter with legiti-
mate complaints about the partnership can withdraw, but if the dissenter
wrongfully withdraws he will be liable for damages.279
The RUPA, by contrast, does not require that a partnership dissolve
upon a partner's "disassociation." 280 In fact, the remaining partners have
ninety days to agree to wind up or dissolve the partnership, or the part-
nership will continue.281 The RUPA values the withdrawing partner's in-
terest "based on 'the greater of the liquidation value or the value based
on a sale of the entire business as a going concern without the disassoci-
ated partner' that 'would be paid by a willing buyer to a willing
seller."282 But in an at-will partnership, as in the UPA, a partner's disas-
sociation still causes the dissolution of the partnership.28 3
On the other hand, close corporation statutes strongly favor continuity
of life, but there is generally no ready market for stock in close corpora-
tions.224 Hence, statutory and judicial solutions surfaced to protect mi-
nority shareholders from oppression.285 But Professor Hamill argues that
these solutions are insufficient compared to the relative ease with which a
partner may withdraw from a partnership. 286 Thus, an LLC member's
withdrawal should trigger a buyout of the member's interest but not
cause the dissolution of the partnership, regardless of the reason for
withdrawal.287
This proposal argues for the repeal of dissolution and disassociation
rules for several reasons. First, perpetual life is probably the option that
most LLC organizers would choose.288 One aim of default rules is to
anticipate what most parties would choose. Absent a compelling compet-
275. See Farrar & Hamill, supra note 15, at 922-23, 938-39.
276. See UPA, supra note 97, § 31; 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP, supra
note 100, § 7.01(a).
277. See UPA, supra note 97, §§ 29,31,38; 2 BROMBERG & RinSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP,
supra note 100, § 7.13.
278. See 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP, supra note 100, § 7.01.
279. A partner who wrongfully withdraws is entitled to the value of his partnership
interest less any damages. See id. § 7.13(b)(1).
280. Id. § 7.13(a).
281. See id.
282. Id.; see also RUPA, supra note 97, § 701(a).
283. See RUPA, supra note 97, § 801; see also Farrar & Hamill, supra note 15, at 919-20.
284. See Farrar & Hamill, supra note 15, at 924.
285. See 2 O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 83,
§§ 7.11-7.14.
286. See Farrar & Hamill, supra note 15, at 939.
287. See id at 938-39.
288. See Oesterle & Gazur, supra note 6, at 144.
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ing policy this is a reasonable basis to select a default rule.289 Second, the
state has an economic interest in keeping capital in businesses. In other
words, default rules should be weighted toward continuing the venture.
Close corporation minority protection rules generally accomplish this re-
sult by allowing dissolution only when the success of the enterprise is at
stake.
Third, if the rule is not repealed, there could be unfavorable taxation
treatment to family limited partnerships that want to convert to an
LLC.29° The Code's Chapter 14 valuation rules could significantly deter
families from organizing under LLC statutes instead of limited partner-
ship statutes.291 Like the family limited partnership, family LLCs are
designed to gift LLC interests to family members in lower tax brackets.
Also, when the parent dies, the LLC interests are left in the estate. The
tax advantage of a family LLC-and family limited partnership-comes
with the reduced valuation of the LLC interests as opposed to the prop-
erty in the LLC.292 But Code section 2704 denies discounts on valuations
of all interests except where state or federal law provides a restriction
(i.e., continuity of life). 293 Professor Hamill argues that this is not a suffi-
cient reason to repeal the dissolution rules. She characterizes the family
limited partnership as an "effective tool for gift and estate tax plan-
ning."'2 94 But the family partnership is more than a tax tool. Families
with businesses-generally small businesses-should have a form that
permits them to transfer the family business from one generation to the
next without onerous tax consequences. Furthermore, these families
should not be relegated to the limited partnership, which requires a gen-
eral partner to assume liability.
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the LLC's dissolution rules should be
repealed. But, absent rules regarding minority oppression, this may leave
no appropriate method for resolving disputes among members. As such,
minority oppression default rules must accompany the repeal of the
LLC's dissolution rules.
5. Default Rule: Protection of Minority Members from Oppression
An LLC with an operating agreement containing provisions that cen-
tralize management, restrict transferability of LLC interests, and provide
perpetual life may present considerable problems for a minority member.
289. See CHARLES R. O'KELLEY, JR. & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ASSOcIATIONS 47-51 (2d ed. 1996).
290. See supra text accompanying notes 122-30.
291. See Ribstein, New Choice of Entity, supra note 164, at 338-40. But Chapter 14 may
not require states to remove the dissolution rules. The family LLC may be valued favora-
bly even if the dissolution rules remain. See Jerry A. Kasner, Does Check-the-Box Spell
Doom for Family Limited Partnerships?, 74 TAX NOTES 474, 475 (1997); Jerry A. Kasner,
LLCs as Family Business Entities-Not There Yet, But Getting Closer, 67 TAX NOTES 1357,
1357 (1995).
292. See supra text accompanying notes 122-30.
293. See Oesterle & Gazur, supra note 6, at 132-41.
294. Farrar & Hamill, supra note 15, at 934 n.107.
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If there is oppressive conduct on the part of majority members, the mi-
nority member may not be able to adequately protect himself. In other
words, the minority member will not be able to withdraw and cause disso-
lution-as in the UPA or RUPA-nor would he be able to sell his interest
to a third party since the LLC has transfer restrictions (also, minority
LLC interests are generally illiquid). 295 Additionally, since this is a man-
ager-managed LLC, the member may not be able to influence the man-
agement of the business in any significant way. Thus, minority
protections, much like those in a statutory close corporation, should be
added to LLC statutes.
The legal evolution of close corporation statutes produced several at-
tempts at controlling minority oppression in the corporation. Several
states allow for judicial dissolution in the event that there is a deadlock
on the board of directors.2 96 Other states have developed more aggres-
sive statutes. For example, judicial dissolution is permitted in several
states if "[t]he directors or those in control of the corporation have acted,
are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or
unfairly prejudicial .... 297 Alaska and California go even further: disso-
lution is appropriate anytime "liquidation is reasonably necessary for the
protections of the rights or interests of the complaining
shareholder ... "298
In order to adequately protect minority members in an LLC from op-
pression, states should incorporate default rules that give courts some dis-
cretion when trying to protect minority members. Thus, LLC statutes
should at least provide for dissolution any time control members are act-
ing in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudi-
cial.299 Better yet, LLC statutes could provide for dissolution any time it
is "reasonably necessary" to a minority member's rights.3°°
295. See id. at 924.
296. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-114-301, -302 (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 14-2-940(a)(2) (Harrison 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.91(a)(4) (Anderson
1997); see also 2 O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 83,
§ 7.11.
297. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-940(a)(1) (Harrison 1998) (emphasis added); see also
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-114-301(2)(b) (West Supp. 1999); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. &
Ass'NS § 3-413(b)(2) (Supp. 1998); O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS,
supra note 83, §§ 7.12, 7.13.
298. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(5) (West Supp. 1998) (emphasis added); ALASKA
STAT. § 10.06.628(b)(5) (Michie 1996); see 2 O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHARE-
HOLDERS, supra note 83, § 7.14. California and Alaska also allow dissolution where
"[t]hose in control ... have been guilty of or have knowingly countenanced persistent and
pervasive fraud, mismanagement or abuse of authority or persistent unfairness toward any
shareholders or its property is being misapplied or wasted by its directors or officers."
CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(4) (West Supp. 1998); see ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.628(4)
(Michie 1996).
299. See, e.g., GEORGIA § 14-2-940(1) (Harrison 1998); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 7-114-301(2)(b) (West 1999); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS . § 3-413(b)(2) (Supp.
1997).
300. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(5) (West Supp. 1998); ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.06.628(5) (Michie 1998).
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Additionally, instead of only providing for judicial dissolution, states
should consider expanding remedies available to dissenting LLC mem-
bers. The Illinois corporations statute has such alternative remedies,
which include appointing a provisional director, appointing a custodian,
and ordering a purchase of the complaining shareholder's shares.301 LLC
statutes should provide these options, which would allow judges to give
an appropriate remedy to minority members without always having to
dissolve the enterprise.
6. Mandatory Rule: Fiduciary Duty
While many states define, to some degree, fiduciary duties in the
LLC,30 2 the appropriate analogy to other business forms has not been
determined by the courts.30 3 State statutes could assist the courts in de-
termining the correct analogy and giving the courts direction in how ex-
tensive a waiver of fiduciary duty should be allowed.
First is the question of the appropriate analogy. State statutes should
determine the analogy for the courts to reduce the uncertainty that ac-
companies the LLC form.304 Since the LLC, according to this proposal,
will be replacing the close corporation, limited partnership, and LLP-all
of which have partnership-like fiduciary duties-states should adopt the
analogy of the partnership.30 5 In other words, legislatures should direct
courts with express language in the LLC statute to apply the same fiduci-
ary standard owed by a partner to a partnership. 30 6 This rule should ap-
ply in manager-managed as well as member-managed LLCs.307
Second, whether the parties to an LLC should be allowed to waive
their fiduciary duties is a question that should be considered carefully.
301. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.55 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
302. See, ag., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7613, 17-7647 (1995 & Supp. 1998); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 13.1-1024 to 1028 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1998).
303. See RiBSrEIN & KEATINGE ON LLCs, supra note 182, § 9.01.
304. See generally Boles & Hamill, supra note 215, at 160-71 (arguing that fiduciary
duties should be added to the Alabama LLC statute); Keatinge et al., A Study of the
Emerging Entity, supra note 56.
305. As then Chief Justice Cordozo suggests, a partner's duty to fellow partners is one
of the highest duties imposed by law:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at
arm's length are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held
to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of eq-
uity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "dis-
integrating erosion" of particular exceptions .... Only thus has the level of
conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the
crowd.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,546 (N.Y. 1928); see also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515-16 (Mass. 1975) (holding the Meinhard
standard also applies to shareholders of a close corporation).
306. California has such a statute: "The fiduciary duties a manager owes to the limited
liability company and to its members are those of a partner to a partnership and to the
partners of the partnership." CAL. CORP. CODE § 17153 (West Supp. 1998).
307. See Boles & Hamill, supra note 215, at 162-71.
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There are economic advantages to allowing an LLC to waive fiduciary
duties.30 8 Mandatory provisions may not suit all firms well.309 For exam-
ple, some firms may authorize managers to conduct business outside the
firm as a form of compensation.310 Also, firms may want to cut costs
avoiding time-consuming litigation on breaches of fiduciary duty.311
Several commentators find these arguments persuasive and have ar-
gued that states should adopt a total waiver provision.312 They argue that
parties should be able to waive all duties, except the contractual duty of
good faith.313 "[P]arties should be able to alter their default duties in
their agreements as long as they are held to good faith compliance with
their contracts. '314
But the relative economic benefits associated with allowing waiver of
fiduciary duties should be offset by the potential cost. First, "the parties
and their counsel may be sufficiently unsophisticated that informed con-
sent is illusory."'315 Second, parties may not be able to effectively foresee
potential wrongdoing.316 Third, in an LLC where interests are freely
transferable and withdrawal of a member does not cause dissolution,
members may not be able to properly defend themselves by selling their
308. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LLCs, supra note 182, § 9.04.
309. See id.
310. See id.
311. See id. There are other economic advantages associated with allowing waiver of
fiduciary duties:
[1] Fiduciaries have varying costs of foregoing opportunities outside the firm
[21 Firms and insiders have potential scope economies of information ...
acquired in their other dealings ....
[3] Fiduciary duties arise in relationships in which it is in the beneficiary's
interest to delegate open-ended decisionmaking power to the fiduciary....
Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 537, 548-49 (1997) [hereinafter Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty]; see also Henry N. Butler &
Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians,
65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Butler & Ribstein].
312. See Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty, supra note 311, at 548-50; Butler & Ribstein, supra
note 311.
313. "[Tlhe function of [the duty of good faith ] is to supply terms the parties could not
determine in advance; it follows that the parties could not knowingly consent to the scope
of any general waiver." RiBSThIN & KEATINGE ON LLCs, supra note 182, § 9.07; see also 2
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, §§ 7.17, 7.17a (1990).
314. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty, supra note 311, at 594. Delaware also has such a waiver
position:
(c) To the extent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager or other
person has duties (including fiduciary duties) and liabilities relating thereto
to a limited liability company or to another member or manager:
(1) Any such member or manager or other person acting under a limited
liability company agreement shall not be liable to the limited liability
company or to any such other member or manager for the member's or
manager's or other person's good faith reliance on the provisions of the
limited liability company agreement; and
(2) The member's or manager's or other person's duties and liabilities
may be expanded or restricted by provisions in a limited liability com-
pany agreement.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (Supp. 1996).
315. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LLCs, supra note 182, § 9.04.
316. See id
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interest or withdrawing from the LLC.317
Manager-managed LLCs, however, are more analogous to the corpora-
tion or limited partnership than the general partnership. 318 The partner-
ship standard of fiduciary duties may be too stringent in this context.3 1
9
Members in a manager-managed LLC may want less strict fiduciary duty
rules. They may also want to afford managers the protection of the busi-
ness judgment rule.320
Thus, states should either adopt a limited waiver provision321 or not
permit waiver at all. Several states and the Model LLC Act have limited
waiver provisions.322 In the Model LLC Act, many fiduciary duties can
be waived with the exception of a total elimination of the duty of loyalty
and duty of care.323 States should be no more permissive than the Model
LLC Act.
7. Mandatory Rule: Agency Restrictions
Uncertainty about whether a particular member can bind an LLC has
caused third parties much concern in dealing with LLCs. Many third par-
ties that do business with LLCs do so warily because the agency authority
of members can be expanded or limited in most states with little no-
tice. 324 In many states, LLCs can limit authority by merely putting the
restriction in the operating agreement and putting a general statement in
the articles of organization that authority has been limited.325 Other
317. See id. §§ 9.10, 9.11 (predicating their position that waiver should be allowed upon
the assumption that transfer of interests would be restricted and LLCs would lack con-
tinuity of life-this is not so after check-the-box). Even if other minority protections are
included in LLC statutes they will be default rules. A default rule on fiduciary duties is
one protection that should not be allowed to be waived. For more on the benefits of fiduci-
ary duties, see Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty, supra note 311, at 546-48.
318. See Boles & Hamill, supra note 215, at 164-71; Ribstein, Emergence of the LLC,
supra note 161, at 9-12.
319. See generally Boles & Hamill, supra note 215, at 171.
320. See generally id.
321. One commentator has suggested that the prevention of theft, self-dealing, and
waste are one of the top three non-tax concerns of a close corporation. See Oesterle &
Gazur, supra note 6, at 130.
322. See ULLCA, supra note 246, § 103; HAw. REv. STAT. § 428-103 (1997); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 3003 (1997).
323. See ULLCA, supra note 246, § 1.03.
324. Increased investigation costs and uncertainty as to the security of a transaction
could cause third parties concern about dealing with LLCs, concerns which will manifest
themselves as increased costs to the LLC. See Ribstein, Emergence of the LLC, supra note
162, at 12; see also Kehoe, supra note 217, at 4-13 ("Where there is no actual authority of
the member or manager to sign on behalf of the company, there is no case law at present to
protect the lender as there is in certain instances where the borrower is a corporation or
partnership.").
325. For instance, in Louisiana:
Persons dealing with a member, if management is reserved to the members,
or manager, if management is vested in one or more managers ... of the
limited liability company shall be deemed to have knowledge of restrictions
on the authority of such a member or manager contained in the written oper-
ating agreement if the articles of organization of the limited liability company
contain a statement that such restrictions exist.
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states require no such statement in the articles of organization. 326
With either type of statute there are considerable problems. States that
do not require disclosure in the articles of organization put the burden on
third parties to protect themselves by reading the LLC's operating agree-
ment. An LLC's operating agreement is typically not publicly available
and there may even be several agreements. 327 Putting the burden on a
third party is both inefficient and leads to confusion in the business
community.
States that require minimal disclosure in the articles of organization
still place too much burden on third parties. Knowing that authority has
been restricted is only marginally helpful without knowing the identity of
the member or the nature of the limitation on the member's authority.
Hence, the statutes should contain a default rule providing that all mem-
bers of an LLC have authority to bind the LLC.328 And states should
require LLCs to put third parties on notice by indicating agency restric-
tions of specific members in the articles of organization.3 29
8. Statutory Language on Piercing the Veil
The extent of the piercing the veil doctrine is uncertain in the LLC.330
As it becomes easier to get limited liability through the LLC form, the
courts will certainly impose liability upon LLC members in certain in-
stances. 331 One of the ways states can make the law more certain and
ensure that the public is protected is by putting specific language in the
LLC statute that addresses this concern.
When courts pierce the veil of a corporation, they look primarily for
the presence of fraud or illegality. Courts will look to see if the corpora-
tion is being operated in such a way that a corporation is just an alter ego
of the owner.332 Courts will also consider piercing the corporate veil if
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1317(B) (West 1994); see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 17151 (West
Supp. 1999). This statute could be read to require the LLC to name the members whose
authority is restricted and how it is restricted, but the more plausible interpretation would
require only a blanket statement that authority of some members has been restricted. See
Kalinka, supra note 220, at 789-91 (suggesting a Louisiana LLC's articles of organization
merely need to state: "The LLC's operating agreement contains certain restrictions on the
authority of members [or managers] to bind the LLC.").
326. See, e.g., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, §§ 2.12, 2.21 (West 1997).
327. See Kalinka, supra note 220, at 790-92.
328. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns § 4A-401(a)(1) (Supp. 1998).
329. See Kalinka, supra note 220, at 792. For instance, all members in a Maryland LLC
have agency authority unless otherwise agreed in the articles of organization. See MD.
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-401(a)(1), (3) (Supp. 1998).
330. See generally Ribstein, Emergence of the LLC, supra note 161. at 8-9 (stating that
the grounds on which courts will pierce the veil of LLCs is one of the most important open
questions regarding LLCs); Eric Fox, Comment, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Com-
panies, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1143 (1994) (stating that the "equitable nature of the veil-
piercing doctrine prevents the development of strict rules as to when it should be
employed").
331. See RIBSIN & KEATINGE ON LLCs, supra note 182, § 12.03.
332. See generally Fox, supra note 330 (stating that the degree to which the corporation
is controlled by the owner is a significant factor for courts to consider when determining
whether to pierce the veil).
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there is inadequate capitalization or a failure to follow corporate formali-
ties.333 Since the LLC has few formalities, there should rarely be an in-
stance of veil piercing because of a failure to follow formalities or that the
LLC was an alter ego. But statutory language should provide that courts
should apply corporate veil piercing doctrine in cases of fraud or illegal-
ity, and should provide that in extreme cases of undercapitalization the
veil can be pierced.334
D. WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN TO OTHER STATUTES?
The next question is what to do with existing statutory forms like the
limited partnership, LLP, LLLP, and the statutory close corporation. If
such statutes were repealed two potential problems would arise. First,
existing organizations formed under a particular statute must still be gov-
erned by that statute. It is impractical to force such organizations to im-
mediately convert to the state's new model. In fact, it may be preferable
to attract these organizations by offering the highly desirable alternative
of the LLC or corporate form. The state's energy and effort should not
be placed on forcing organizations to convert but on making it more de-
sirable and easier for them to do so.
Second, the statutes should not be removed since the Treasury has
been known to change its mind. If the Treasury decided that check-the-
box was not working or not a good policy, then many of the existing enti-
ties may again be useful.335 Although this is unlikely,336 states should not
throw away developed law because to do so may require the state to
reinvent the wheel at the Treasury's beckon.
333. See id.
334. A good example comes from Colorado's LLC law. There the law specifically in-
corporates the corporate veil piercing doctrine in the LLC. The statute reads as follows:
(1) In any case in which a party seeks to hold the members of a limited
liability company personally responsible for the alleged improper actions of
the limited liability company, the court shall apply the case law which inter-
prets the conditions and circumstances under which the corporate veil of a
corporation may be pierced ....
(2) For purposes of this section, the failure of a limited liability company to
observe the formalities or requirements relating to the management of its
business and affairs is not in itself a ground for imposing personal liability on
the members for liabilities of the limited liability company.
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-107 (West Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
335. Some commentators have suggested that the Service exceeded its authority by re-
leasing the check-the-box regulations. While a reversal of check-the-box is unlikely, states
may need to face regulations like the Kintner regulations again. See Martin McMahon Jr.,
AALS Tax Section Looks at LLCs and Taxation of Business Enterprises, 70 TAx NoTES
511,513 (1996); Victor E. Fleischer, "If it Looks Like a Duck" Corporate Resemblance and
Check-the-Box Elective Tax Classification, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 518, 553, n.165 (1996); Rib-
stein, New Choice of Entity, supra note 163, at 345.
336. See George K. Yin, The Taxation of Private Business Enterprises: Some Policy





If a state were to adopt this three-statute approach it would be neces-
sary to promote the system by making it easy for businesses to convert
from their existing entity to an entity of choice: the partnership, corpora-
tion, or LLC. Conversion from a corporation to an LLC can be prohibi-
tive if state laws do not allow for seamless conversions and if federal or
state tax law taxes the transaction. Quick, painless transition will remove
the disincentive arising from conversion.
A. UNIVERSAL CONVERSION PROVISIONS
State legislatures should provide universal conversion provisions as
either a stand-alone statute or as a sub-part of each of the general part-
nership, LLC, and corporate statutes. 337 The statute should require the
approval of all members in the absence of a contravening agreement be-
tween the parties. 338
337. New York and Texas have adopted conversion provisions within their LLC stat-
utes. See N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW §§ 1006, 1007 (McKinney Supp. 1999); TEx. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, §§ 10.03 to 10.11 (West 1998). Texas has adopted similar provisions
in its corporation statute, see Tax. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 5.17 (West 1997), lim-
ited partnership statute, see TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 9.05 (West Supp.
1998), and general partnership statute, see id. 33 2.02, 9.01.
Texas requires the entity to set out a plan of conversion that must be approved. See TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 10.08(C) (West 1998). If the plan of conversion is
approved then a representative of the entity must execute articles of conversion that set
forth:
(1) the plan of conversion ... certifying the following:
(a) the name, the state of incorporation, formation, or organization of
the converting entity, and the organizational form of the converting
entity;
(b) that a plan of conversion has been approved;
(c) that an executed plan of conversion is on file at the principal place of
business of the converting entity... and;
(d) that a copy of the plan of conversion will be furnished by the con-
verting entity (prior to the conversion) or the converted entity (after the
conversion), on written request and without cost, to any shareholder,
partner, or member of the converting entity or the converted entity;
(2) a statement that the approval of the plan of conversion was duly author-
ized by all action required by the laws under which the converting entity was
incorporated, formed, or organized and by its constituent documents;...
Id. § 10.09(A).
338. See, e.g., N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW §§ 1006, 1007 (McKinney Supp. 1999); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 10.09(A)(2) (West Supp. 1999). New York's default
rule requires unanimous consent in the conversion of a general partnership to a LLC:
Subject to any requirements in the partnership agreement requiring approval
by any lesser percentage in interest of partners, an agreement of conversion
setting forth the terms and conditions of a conversion of a partnership to a
limited liability company must be approved by all of the partners of the
partnership.
N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 1006(c) (McKinney Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
New York has special rules for converting from a limited partnership. Absent a contrary
agreement, general partners must unanimously consent to the conversion. At least two-
thirds of limited partners must consent if there is no agreement to the contrary. In any
case, an agreement cannot specify a percentage of limited partner approval that is less than
the approval of the majority-in-interest. See id. § 1006(c).
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The effect of such a conversion should not penalize the entity, but
rather protect creditor and state interests.339 First, the entity should con-
tinue to exist, without interruption.340 Second, the conversion should not
disrupt any property interests, real or personal, that the entity held prior
to conversion.341 Third, conversion statutes should protect creditors by
transferring all debts and obligations of the old entity to the new en-
tity.3 42 Fourth, parties to a conversion should not have to assume per-
sonal liability, unless they have agreed to do so in writing343 or unless the
party was liable under prior law in the converting entity.344 Fifth, all pro-
ceedings against the old entity should continue as to the new entity.345
And sixth, unless otherwise agreed, all partners or shareholders of the
previous entity should be members in the LLC.346 Universal conversion
provisions allow for quick, painless conversion from a state law
perspective.
B. FEDERAL TAXATION ISSUES IN CONVERSION
Presently, if a close corporation were to find converting to an LLC de-
sirable, there may be serious federal tax consequences for doing so. The
corporation would have to liquidate then file for LLC status under state
law (pursuant to the universal conversion provision, if in a state like
Texas). 347 In a complete corporate liquidation, the corporation must rec-
ognize any gain or loss on property distributed to the extent the fair mar-
ket value of the property exceeds the adjusted basis.348 Similarly,
shareholders must report gain recognized in the liquidation,349 which will
be long term capital gain if the stock is held for more than one year.350
Moreover, if the shareholders intend to continue the existing business or-
ganized as an LLC, they may have to determine the value of the business
339. A good example of the effect of an LLC conversion is set forth in the New York
statute: "A partnership or limited partnership that has been converted ... is for all pur-
poses the same entity that existed before the conversion." N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW
§ 1007 (McKinney Supp. 1999). Instead of limiting the statute to "partnership or limited
partnership," statutes should include all forms of business, including corporations. Id.
340. See, e.g., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 10.11(A)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
341. See, eg., N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 1007(b)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
342. See, eg., id. § 1007(b)(ii); see also TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n,
§ 10.11A(3) (West Supp. 1999) ("[A]II liabilities and obligations of the converting entity
shall continue to be liabilities and obligations of the converted entity in its new organiza-
tional form without impairment or diminution by reason of the conversion."); Id.
§ 10.11A(1) (providing that all rights of creditors prior to the conversion carry full effect as
though the conversion did not happen).
343. See id. § 10.11A(7)(a).
344. See id. § 10.11A(7)(b).
345. See, eg., N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 1007(b)(iii) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
346. See, eg., id. § 1007(b)(iv) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
347. See supra text accompanying notes 337-46.
348. See I.R.C. § 336 (1999). See generally George K. Yin, Taxing Corporate Liquida-
tions (and Related Matters) After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 42 TAX L. REV. 574 (1987)
(analyzing corporate liquidations after the 1986 Tax Reform Act).
349. See I.R.C. §§ 331, 1001 (1999).
350. See id. §§ 1221, 1222 (1999).
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as a going concern. 351 The foregoing would be true also for S Corpora-
tions since subchapter S sends all corporate liquidation questions to sub-
chapter C.352
Formation of an LLC after a complete liquidation and contributions of
property into the new LLC would be tax-neutral events. 3 53 Gain or loss
on property contributed to the LLC would not be recognized. 354 Mem-
bers will take an exchanged basis in their LLC interest,355 and the LLC
will take a transferred basis in the contributed property.356
A general partnership or limited partnership would face similar tax
pressures in converting to an LLC,357 but, through Revenue Rulings 84-
52358 and 95-37,359 the Service has allowed such partnerships to convert
without adverse tax consequences.360 The effect of these revenue rulings
is that no gain or loss is recognized as a result of the conversion, there is
no change in the adjusted basis of any partner's basis, and the holding
period of a partner's total interest remains the same.361 In fact, the new
LLC will not even need to apply for a new taxpayer identification
number.362
There is good justification for the Service to adopt a ruling similar to
Revenue Rulings 84-52 and 95-37 that would benefit corporations.
3 63
351. The shareholders would have to assess not only the fair market value of the assets
of the liquidating corporation, but also the value of the accumulated good will that the
business had developed. See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237; see also I.R.C. § 1060
(1999). See generally ROHRLICH, supra note 90, § 3.1412].
352. See I.R.C. § 1371 (1999).
353. See id. § 721(a) (1999); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (1998).
354. See I.R.C. § 721(a) (1999). But property that was distributed to shareholders
through the corporate liquidation will have a fair market value basis in the hands of the
shareholders. See I.R.C. § 334(a) (1999). This nonrecognition rule is only necessary for
property contributed to the LLC that was not distributed as part of the corporate
liquidation.
355. That is, the member will exchange the basis in the contributed property for the
basis in the LLC interest. See I.R.C. § 722 (1999).
356. That is, the LLC's basis in the property will be the basis as it was in the hands of
the member immediately prior to contribution. See id. § 723 (1999). If the corporate liqui-
dation and LLC formation are part of the same transaction, the basis will be the fair mar-
ket value of the property since the member will have a fair market value basis from the
liquidation. See id. § 334(a) (1999).
357. A partner must recognize gain or loss on the sale or exchange of his partnership
interest. See id. §§ 741, 1001 (1999).
358. Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157. Revenue Ruling 84-52 deals with conversions
from general partnerships to limited partnerships and from limited partnerships to general
partnerships.
359. Rev. Rul. 95-37, 1995-1 C.B. 130. Revenue Ruling 95-37 adopted the 84-52 Ruling
for general partnerships and limited partnerships converting to the LLC.
360. See Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157; see also Rev. Rul. 95-37, 1995-1 C.B. 130.
361. See Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157; Rev. Rule 95-37, 1995-1 C.B. 130.
362. See Rev. Rul. 95-37, 1995-1 C.B. 130.
363. See generally Hamill, The Limited Liability Company, supra note 8, at 415, 430;
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT-. TAXATION OF PRIVATE
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, Memorandum No. 3, 3-12 (September 10, 1997) (on file with au-
thor). There is resistance to this approach. For instance, the Clinton budget proposal in-
cludes a "[r]epeal of tax-free conversions of large C Corporations to S corporations."
Ryan J. Donmoyer et al., The Clinton Budget: A Tax Increase Based on Shaky Revenue-
Raisers, 78 TAX NOTES 639, 640 (1998).
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The current system of double taxing closely held corporations is unfair for
two reasons. First, it unfairly double taxes unsophisticated businesses and
allows sophisticated businesses to escape double taxation by paying out
earnings in deductible items like salaries, rent, or interest.364 Second, the
"current system for imposing the corporate tax on nonpublicly traded
businesses employs a double standard based on whether the business has
incorporated under state law."'365 Providing tax-free conversion to the
LLC will bring the check-the-box regulations full circle, and it will pro-
vide an equal playing field for closely held businesses. 36
6
An alternative solution, as presented by Professor Walter D.
Schwidetzky, contemplates the wholesale repeal of subchapter S.367
Although Congress has substantially changed subchapter S in recent
years,368 it is an outmoded provision of the Code that is still fundamen-
tally flawed.369 Professor Schwidetzky suggests that current S corpora-
tions should be given five years to convert to an unincorporated
organization or alternatively to remain a corporation and become a C
corporation. This proposal would have essentially the same effect as Rev-
enue Rulings 84-52 and 95-37, but the repeal of subchapter S would elimi-
nate future confusion by removing a potential trap for the unwary
business person.
Thus, Congress should repeal subchapter S and allot S corporations a
period of time to make a tax-free conversion to an unincorporated entity.
If Congress does not repeal subchapters, the Service should issue revenue
rulings similar to 84-52 and 95-37, which would allow for tax-neutral con-
version from a corporation to an LLC. Either approach gives parties the
freedom to choose business form without intrusive tax burdens.
C. STATE TAXATION SHOULD MIRROR THE CHECK-THE-Box FORMAT
Finally, the check-the-box regulations also provide an opportunity for
states to reexamine their business enterprise laws and taxation system.
Many states still have classification systems similar to the Kintner Regula-
364. See Hamill, The Limited Liability Company, supra note 8, 415, 430. Such a system
"violate[s] fundamental principals of horizontal equity." Id. at 431.
365. Id. at 429; see also American Law Institute, supra note 363.
366. See Hamill, The Limited Liability Company, supra note 8, at 433 ("Only after
lawmakers integrate close corporations, thus removing the tax advantage LLCs currently
enjoy, can new businesses choose between the LLC and the closely held corporation with-
out regard to tax consequences.. ").
367. See Schwidetzky, supra note 44, at 636-38.
It is not worth the statutory effort to retain subchapter S merely because the
S corporations [sic] possesses a few advantages in limited circumstances over
LLC's. The legal landscape is complex enough. The Service, the court sys-
tem, and tax professionals do not need to be burdened by marginally benefi-
cial statutes and regulations. The time of the S corporation has past.... A
major blow for tax simplification would be struck by repealing subchapter S
of the Code.
Id. at 638
368. See id. at 626-36; see also 2 HoOD & MYLAN, supra note 44, § 24:01.
369. See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
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tions.370 Thus, states that have such a system would tax an LLC as a
corporation if it had more than two of the following Kintner characteris-
tics: limited liability, transferability of interest, continuity of life, and cen-
tralized management. This proposal argues that the state taxation
classification system should mirror the check-the-box regulations. In
other words, states should allow unincorporated organizations to elect
their tax classification-corporation or partnership-for state tax
purposes.
Failure to do this will place serious financial complications in the path
of an entity seeking to convert. This is especially true of partnerships
since they are taxed on a flow-through basis under state law. Conversion
to an LLC in a state that has an entity tax on an LLC would create annual
tax liability for the partnership, which can often be substantial. Hence,
partnerships may opt out of converting since that would add to the en-
tity's state tax liability.
While many states have already converted to the check-the-box
model,371 there are legitimate problems that stand in the way of some
states making such a change. 372 For example, states without a personal
income tax-like Texas-may choose not to conform to check-the-box. 373
Replacing an entity-level tax with pass-through taxation would allow an
LLC to escape taxation altogether. Thus, these states may continue to
tax LLCs as corporations or have some other entity level tax.374 This
could prevent LLCs from maximizing the benefits of the federal check-
the-box regulations; it will also damage the effectiveness of this three-
statute proposal.375
V. CONCLUSION
Present day statutory schemes for business organizations may have
been considerably less complex had the federal tax pressures been less
overt. Statutory forms like the close corporation, LLP, LLC and LLLP
are examples of the complexities that have developed. State legislatures
should take the opportunity that the check-the-box regulations presents
370. See supra text accompanying 54-62.
371. For a list of states that have adopted the check-the-box style of classification for
state taxation purposes see Bruce P. Ely & Christopher R. Grissom, The LLCILLP Score
Card, 98 TNT 225-72, Nov. 23, 1998, available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, TNT File.
372. Several states apply a franchise tax to LLCs. As of the writing of this article, they
include: Kansas, Ohio, Texas, and West Virginia. See id. California, effective October, 1,
1997, Florida, effective July 1, 1998, and Pennsylvania, effective January 1, 1998, have re-
cently adopted policies that reflect the federal check-the-box regulations. See id.
373. "Corporate tax treatment for LLCs is necessary to ensure the taxation of the LLC.
Otherwise, an LLC would be taxed as a passthrough entity and could escape state taxes
altogether because no income tax is assessed at the individual level." Thomas M. Hayes,
Comment, Checkmate, the Treasury Finally Surrenders: The Check-the-Box Treasury Regu-
lations and their Effect on Entity Classification, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1147, 1179 n.222
(1997) (citations omitted).
374. For example, Texas subjects LLCs to the corporate franchise tax. See Ely & Gris-
som, supra note 371, at 225-72.
375. See Hayes, supra note 346, at 1178-80.
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to revisit their statutes. An analysis of current business issues leads to a
more simplified approach.
But Professor Ribstein, for one, disagrees with this approach.376 He
claims that while narrow-thinking tax lawyers may agree that statutes
should be simplified, 377 business lawyers have real-world reasons for
maintaining separate statutes. 378 Specifically, he points to the family lim-
ited partnership as one such "clientele" of business association that would
benefit from diverse statutes. 379 He asserts that the limited partnership
should remain on the books because the dissolution rules in the LLC
would cause the family business to receive less favorable treatment under
the Code's valuation rules.380 This Comment has shown, however, that
state legislatures can safely eliminate dissolution rules if legislatures also
draft minority protection rules into the LLC statute.381 Further, family
businesses should not be forced to select a general partner; they should
receive the LLC's limited liability and flexibility benefits as well.382
Two business forms remain fundamental: the corporation and the part-
nership. These historic business forms should remain largely intact.
Other forms, like the LLP, limited partnership, and close corporation
have become outdated. The LLC should be amended to become hospita-
ble to the "clienteles" 383 of each of these forms. As such, the simplified
approach legislatures should take should include only the general part-
nership, the LLC, and the corporation.
376. See Check-the-Box and Beyond, supra note 6, at 612; Ribstein, New Choice of En-
tity, supra note 164, at 334-35.
377. See Ribstein, New Choice of Entity, supra note 164, at 334 ("Tax lawyers may be-
lieve that ... there is no further reason to have many different types of business association
statutes. I would compare this to the famous cover of the New Yorker magazine that
portrayed a New Yorker's view of the United States, with the Hudson River where the
Mississippi should be.").
378. See id. at 335.
379. See id. at 335-43.
380. See id. at 338-40.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 295-301.
382. See supra text accompanying notes 122-30 and 290-94.
383. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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